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INTRODUCTION 
The elderly, aged 65 or older, now constitute the largest single group receiving 
governmental cash transfers, with 31 .6 million retirees currently receiving Social Security 
benefits (Social Security Bulletin, 1997). That is, over 93 percent of persons 65 and over 
receive Social Security benefits. More than one-third of the elderly depend on Social Security 
for 90 percent or more their annual income (Melcher, 1988). In addition, Radner (1995) also 
pointed out that increases in mean Social Security benefits were important in the increase in 
the total income of the elderly since 1967. Therefore, the importance of Social Security as a 
base for the financial well-being of older Americans is clearly evident here. The motivation 
for this thesis is to explain the effect of three factors on Social Security Old-Age and 
Survivors Insurance (OASI) benefits: earnings, mortality, and the Consumer Price Index. 
There are six remaining chapters in the thesis. The first examines the role of earnings 
in the Social Security program. Under current Jaw, Social Security benefits are an earned 
right in which benefit amounts are determined by the lifetime earnings histories of individuals 
and their spouses. Namely, the level of one's Social Security benefit is based on a measure of 
one's lifetime earnings. Earnings differentials related to socioeconomic characteristics, such 
as race and gender, will be reflected in OASI benefit differentials after retirement. I examine 
differences in mean earnings of various socioeconomic groups to show how these differences 
are likely to result in different levels of future OASI benefits. 
Several researchers have shown that differential mortality rates may have a significant 
influence on the distributional character of the Social Security program (Duggan, Gillingham, 
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and Greenlees, 1993; Aaron, 1977; Wolff, 1987). Their results show that mortality rates 
offset to varying degrees the effect of the progressive benefit formula on rates of return on 
payroll tax contributions. An illustration from Steuerle and Bakija (1994), shows that the 
projected lifetime net transfer for low-wage female workers retiring in 2030, for example, will 
be reduced by about $9,500 when adjusted for differential mortality, whereas the lifetime 
transfer going to high-wage female workers will be increased by $24,400. Although the 
shock of differential mortality rates causes a modest reduction in the progressivity of Social 
Security program, the change is noticeable. From 1995 to 2030, they project that all low-
wage groups will experience a 30 to 50 percent drop in the net transfer, except for two-
eamer couples, but also the net transfer of all high-wage groups will increase by from 13 to 
75 percent. In addition, Garrett (1995) compared the net returns of poor households to the 
net returns of other households after taking into account differential longevity. He tried to 
discover how significantly differential mortality affects the progressivity of OASI in the 1925 
birth cohort. He found that differences in mortality greatly reduce the progressive spread in 
returns across income categories. The internal rates of return for the lowest quintile decreases 
from 3.52 percent to 2.90 percent. In contrast, the internal rates of return for the highest 
quintile increases from 2.46 percent to 2.61 percent. Socioeconomic status and differentials in 
mortality will be discussed in the second chapter. 
Since needs tend to increase and abilities to decrease at older ages, one would expect 
that a progressive need-oriented system like Social Security would attempt to increase real 
benefit levels over the aging process. Beginning in 1975, automatic benefit increases, also 
known as a cost-of-living adjustment or COLA, have been in the effect in the Social Security 
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program. The purpose of the COLA is to maintain a recipient's benefit level at a constant real 
value, or purchasing power, from age of retirement to age of death. After 1982, the COLA 
becomes effective with the January benefit payment. It is equal to the percentage increase in 
the Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers (CPI-W) between 
the third quarter of the previous year and the corresponding third quarter one year earlier. 
Until 1985 there was a trigger requirement such that the COLA would not be given ifthe CPI 
increase is less than 3. 0 percent. Suppose, for example, that this provision had been in effect 
in 1985-87, and the CPI had risen by only 1.3 percent from the third quarter of 1985 to the 
third quarter of 1986, the latter would not be a base quarter. If the rise measured from the 
third quarter of 1985 to the third quarter of 1987 had been 5.5 percent, the latter would be 
the new base quarter, and benefits would be increased by this amount, beginning with the 
benefit payment in January 1988. If the CPI has an upward bias, federal programs like OASI 
would overcompensate for the effect of price changes on living standards, and wealth would 
be transferred from younger and future generations to current recipients of indexed federal 
programs. The third chapter discusses alleged bias in the Consumer Price Index. 
The fourth chapter uses a numerical example to explain the effect of the annual cost-
of-living adjustment on Social Security benefits. The fifth chapter discusses whether elderly 
people need a separate Consumer Price Index to protect them from being affected by 
inflation. The last section summarizes the thesis' s findings and suggests directions for further 
research. 
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THE ROLE OF EARNINGS IN THE SOCIAL SECURITY 
PROGRAM 
Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME) 
The level of one' s Social Security benefit is based on a measure of one' s lifetime 
earnings, or more precisely, the average indexed monthly earnings (AIME). A worker's 
earnings are "indexed" to reflect the change in general wage levels that occurred during the 
worker' s years of employment. Such indexation ensures that a worker's future benefits reflect 
the general rise in the standard of living that occurs during his or her working lifetime. To 
accomplish this, each year's wage is multiplied by an "indexing factor'', which equals the ratio 
of the average national wage in the year the worker turns 60 to the average national wage in 
the year to be indexed. For instance, for a person retiring at age 65 in 1995, the person's 
earnings would be indexed to the national average wage index for 1990, or $21 ,027.98. 
Earnings in a year before 1990 would be multiplied by the ratio of $21 , 027. 98 to the national 
average wage index for that year; earnings in 1990 or later enter the AIME computation at 
their nominal values. 
To compute the AIME for a worker attaining age 62, becoming disabled before age 
62, or dying before attaining age 62, in 1992, the national average wage index for 1990, 
$21,027.98, is divided by the national average wage index for each year prior to 1990 in 
which the worker had earnings. Taxable wages credited for each year are multiplied by the 
corresponding ratio to obtain the worker's indexed earnings for each year before 1990. Any 
earnings in 1990 or later are considered at face value, without indexing. From this set of 
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earnings, the best 35 years are selected, added together, and divided by 420 (the number of 
months in 35 years). The result is the AIME (Meyer and Wolff, 1993; Myers, 1993; Steuerle 
and Bakija, 1994). 
Primary Insurance Amounts (PIA) 
The PIA is the basic monthly benefit paid to someone who has stopped working and 
then begins to collect benefits before adjustments for factors such as early or delayed 
retirement and spousal benefits. A progressive feature of the Social Security program in the 
United States is a rate structure in the benefit formula that provides a higher rate of return on 
the contributions of workers with low earnings than for those with high earnings. 
The PIA is the sum of three separate percentages of portions of the AIME. For 
workers turning 65 in 1995, the formula for determining the PIA is 
(1) 90 percent of the first $387 of their AIME, plus 
(2) 32 percent of the AIME over $387 and through $2,333, plus 
(3) 15 percent of the AIME over $2,333 . 
The bracket limits in the benefit formula are referred to as "bend points." They are 
adjusted upward each year by the appropriate wage index. This procedure assures that 
average benefits paid to successive cohorts will rise each year to keep pace with increases in 
average earnings, as noted above. 
In short, under current law Social security benefits are an earned right in which 
benefit amounts are determined by the lifetime earnings histories of individuals and their 
spouses. 
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Race, Sex, and the Distribution of Total Earnings 
It is important to perceive that those comparative results deal only with full-time 
workers. Although ignoring the effects of unemployment and part-time labor, I make a most 
conservative evaluation of the differentials in total earnings when the individuals involved are 
working at full-time jobs. 
The order of total earnings was White males, White females, Black males, Black 
females through the 1950s; but since 1960 the total earnings of full-time employed Black 
males has exceeded that of similarly employed White females (Winnick, 1989). Up to 1991, 
the order of total earnings was also White males, Black males, Hispanic males, White 
females, Black females, Hispanic females. While Hispanic males have been catching up to 
Black males since 1989, the percentage gap between them is the same as it had been back in 
1965. 
Total Earnings Differentials by Race 
Ordinarily, the income from all sources is higher for Whites than for Blacks and 
Hispanics. Whites also receive higher earnings relative to Blacks and Hispanics, on average 
(Aquirre, 1990; Horton, Thomas, and Herring, 1995; Winnick, 1989; Wolff, 1987). Table I 
reports mean earnings of workers 18 years old and over by race and sex from 1985 to 1994. 
The level of total earnings trended upward over time, the exceptions being for Black males 
between 1990-91 and Hispanic females between 1992-93. 
Table 2 deals with Blacks/Whites in columns I and 2. Table 3 presents Hispanics/ 
Whites and Hispanics/ Blacks in columns 1,2,5 and 6, respectively. I intend to examine the 
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Table 1. Mean earnings of workers 18 years old and over, by race, Hispanic origin, 
and sex: 1985 to 1994 
Year White Male White Female Black Male Black Female Hisp Male Hisp Female 
1985 22,604 11 ,555 14,932 10,904 15,293 9,865 
1986 23,892 12,247 15,441 11 ,571 15,624 10,457 
1987 24,898 13,161 16,171 12,106 17,048 11,234 
1988 26,184 13,902 17,782 12,916 17,357 11,573 
1989 28,013 14,810 18,108 14,122 18,087 12,307 
1990 28,105 15,559 18,859 14,449 18,320 12,516 
1991 28 ,516 16,431 18,607 15,065 18,516 13,069 
1992 29,515 17,289 19,278 15,605 18,842 13,880 
1993 31,719 18,028 21 ,108 16,336 19,460 13,602 
1994 33,292 18,912 22,614 17,200 21,288 14,631 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and Earnings, January issues; and 
unpubljshed data, 1985 to 1994. 
Table 2. Earnings ratios (1) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Year BM/WM BF/WF BF/BM WF/WM WF/BM BF/WM 
1985 66.06% 94.37% 73.02% 51 .12% 77.38% 48.24% 
1986 64.63 94.48 74.94 51 .26 79.31 48.43 
1987 64.95 91 .98 74.86 52.86 81 .39 48.62 
1988 67.91 92.91 72.64 53.09 78.18 49.33 
1989 64.64 95.35 77.99 52.87 81 .79 50.41 
1990 67.10 92.87 76.62 55.36 82.50 51.41 
1991 65.25 91 .69 80.96 57.62 88.31 52.83 
1992 65.32 90.26 80.95 58.58 89.68 52.87 
1993 66.55 90.61 77.39 56.84 85.41 51 .50 
1994 67.93 90.95 76.06 56.81 83.63 51 .66 
pattern of racial differentials in total earnings among full-time workers with both tables. The 
BM/WM ratio stays steadily between 64 percent and 68 percent from 1985 to 1994. The BF/ 
WF ratio remained a little below 93 percent, except in 1985, 1986, and 1989. These group 
differences in total earnings also show up as differences in poverty rates. Thirty-eight percent 
of rural Blacks and 29.4 percent of urban Blacks live below the poverty threshold. 
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Table 3. Earnings ratios (2) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Year HM/WM HF/WF HF/HM HF/WM HM/BM HF/BF 
1985 48.24% 43.64% 64.51% 43.64% 102.42% 90.47% 
1986 48.43 43.77 66.93 43.77 101 .19 90.37 
1987 48.62 45.12 65.90 45.12 105.42 92.80 
1986 49.33 44.20 66.66 44.20 97.61 89.60 
1989 50.41 43.93 68.04 43.93 99.88 87.15 
1990 51 .41 44.53 66.32 44.53 97.14 86.62 
1991 52.83 45.83 70.56 45.83 99.51 86.75 
1992 52.87 47.03 73.67 47.03 97.74 86.95 
1993 51 .50 42.88 69.90 42.88 92.19 83.26 
1994 51 .66 43.95 66.73 43.95 94.14 85.06 
Note: WM-- White Male BF--Black Female 
WF-- White Female HM--Hisp Male 
BM-- Black Male HF--Hisp Female 
In contrast, 13 . 1 percent of rural Whites and 8. 7 percent of urban Whites live below the 
poverty line (Horton, Thomas, and Herring, 1995). 
The HM/WM, HF /WF, HM/BM, and HF /BF total earnings differentials constantly 
deteriorate in the relative total earnings of Hispanic full-time workers, compared to Whites 
and Blacks of the same sex between 1992 and 1994 . Among both males and females, the gap 
between Hispanic and White full-time workers is wider than between Blacks and Whites. 
From the HM/BM ratio in Table 3, I find Hispanics fall below Blacks in total earnings among 
full-time workers since 1988. There has been some widening of the differential between 
Hispanic and Black males since 1992. The relative position of Hispanic females, compared to 
Black females, varied within a narrow range until 1993, when the relative status of Hispanic 
females worsened significantly. 
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In short, the racial differential increased from 1991 to 1994 (BF/WF: 91.69%-
90.95%; HM/WM: 52.83%-51.66%; HF/WF: 45.83%-43 .95%). Only the ratio of Black 
male to White male earnings increased, from 65.25% to 67.93%. 
Total Earnings Differentials by Sex 
The ratio of female-to-male total earnings increased dramatically between 1985 and 
1994, though it fluctuated between 1991 and 1994 (WF/WM: 51.12%-56.81 %; BF/BM: 
73.02%-76.06%; HF/HM: 64.51%-68.73%; WF/BM: 77.38%-83 .63%; BF/WM: 48.24%-
51.66%; HF/WM: 43 .64%-43 .95%). However, the BF/BM ratio has fallen since 1991. 
Because the total earnings of Hispanic females went down by $278 between 1992 and 1993, 
the HF/HM ratio descended from 73 .67 percent to 68.73 percent. There was a modest 
improvement in the ratios to both males and females with the same race from 1985 to 1986. 
After 1986, all three ratios, WF/WM, BF/BM, and HF/HM, fluctuated within a narrow range. 
In brief, the sexual differential was reduced from 1985 to 1994. But during the 1970s, 
a meaningful change in the formation of the family was an increase in the number of female-
headed households, households in which the woman does not have access to the resources 
brought in by a male worker. By 1983 about one out of three persons below the poverty level 
belonged to a family maintained by a woman with no husband present. About two-fifths of 
the overall increase in the number of poor families since 1980 was attributable to an increase 
in the number of families maintained by women (Aguirre, 1990). 
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SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS AND DIFFERENTIALS IN 
MORTALITY 
For many years now, researchers have indicated that socioeconomic status, especially 
race, sex, and educational attainment, are correlated with an individual 's inequality in the face 
of death. Mortality rates were found to be higher for Nonwhites relative to Whites, for males 
relative to females, and for the less educated relative to the more educated (Feldman, 
Mackuc, Kleinaman, and Comoni-Huntley, 1989; Hadley and Osei, 1982; Kitagawa and 
Hauser, 1973; Mare, 1990; Nathanson, 1995; Sorlie, Backlund, and Keller, 1995; Wolff, 
1987). Mostly it has been presumed that the secular decline in mortality in the currently 
industrialized countries was accompanied by a reduction in socioeconomic differentials 
(Pamuk, 1985). In fact, what little empirical evidence exists does not support the notion of a 
continuous decline in mortality differentials. Recent studies using data from the United States 
have revealed a deteriorating relationship of socioeconomic differentials to mortality. Results 
from Kitagawa and Hauser (1973) are based on the 1960 Matched Records study and the 
special tabulations of 1959-61 deaths for the entire nation compiled by the National Center 
for Health Statistics. The U.S. National Longitudinal Mortality Study (1992), on the other 
hand, is based on matching individual records from Census Bureau Samples for 1,281,475 
persons to the National Death Index for years 1979-1985. The basic objective of the study is 
to investigate socioeconomic, demographic and occupational differentials in mortality within 
the United States. 
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To summarize, lower mortality was found among Whites than Blacks for persons less 
than 65 years of age and among persons with higher incomes and with more education. With 
occasional exceptions, in specific sex and age groups, these relationships were reduced but 
remained strong and statistically significant when each variable was adjusted for all of the 
other characteristics. The relationships were generally weaker in individuals 65 years of age 
or more (Behrman, Sickles, Taubman, and Y azbeck, 1991; Chapman, LaPlante, and 
Wilensky, 1986; Kestenbaum, 1992; Kitagawa and Hauser, 1973 ; Sorlie, Backlund, and 
Keller, 1995; U.S. National Longitudinal Mortality Study, 1992). 
Life expectancy, estimating the average number of future years of life remaining at a 
specific age and year, has varied significantly over this century. The most rapid gain in life 
expectancy at birth occurred from 1940 to 1954. This gain was somewhat more accelerated 
for females, resulting in a further widening of the sex differential in life expectancy. From 
1954 to 1968, the rate of improvement in life expectancy slowed for both sexes, but more so 
for males than females. From 1978 to 1982, the annual rate of increase for males was 0.325 
years, while that for females was 0.225 years (Chapman, LaPlante, and Wilensky, 1986). 
From 1990 to 2020, the probability of surviving from age 65 to age 95 is expected to nearly 
double. From 1990 to 2050, the number of elders aged 85 and over is expected to increase 
more than fivefold. In all likelihood, by 2050 there will be more than 26 million Americans 
aged 85 and older and they will represent about 5 percent of the total population. Of that 26 
million, more than 2.5 million will be centenarians (Atchley, 1995). 
Even though average life expectancy has increased, regardless of race or sex, 
socioeconomic differentials in mortality have increased. Furthermore, individuals of lower 
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socioeconomic status are at a disadvantage when it comes to many of the psychosocial and 
environmental risk factors associated with functional Hmitations, for instances, health 
behaviors and work-related hazards. These factors may have additive positive effects on 
mortality (Behrman, Sickles, Taubman, and Y azbeck, 1991; Chapman, LaPlante, and 
Wilensky, 1986; Dunkle and Lynch, 1995; Kitagawa and Hauser, 1973; Lopez, Caselli, and 
Valkonen, 1995; Mare, 1990; Sorlie, Backlund, and Keller, 1995; U.S. National Longitudinal 
MortaHty Study, 1992). 
Sex 
The late twentieth-century movement of women in many developed countries away 
from an exclusive involvement in the domestic sphere of home and family into the public 
world of paid employment and political action has led many observers to consider the effect 
of these changes on women's mortality, and to forecast that women will experience men' s 
mortalhy risks along with other characteristics conventionally attributed to the masculine role 
(Nathanson, 1995). In fact, male mortality is still higher than female mortality at all ages, 
although the sex differential tends to decrease at the oldest ages (Chapman, LaPlante, and 
Wilensky, 1986; Himes, Preston, and Condran, 1994; Nathanson, 1995; Vallin, 1995). 
Himes, Preston, and Condran ( 1994) constructed a relational model of old age 
mortality that summarizes the annual deaths and enumerated populations from 16 
industrialized countries and covers the period from 1950 to 1985. They showed that the 
mortaHty rate is higher for males than for females at every age, with the greatest sex 
difference occurring between ages 55 and 65 . The period life of males and females published 
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by U.S. Social Security Administration, May 28, 1997, also shows that females have a lower 
mortality rate than males for all ages; see the totals in Table 4 . 
Race 
Throughout much of their lifespan, Blacks have a higher age-specific death rate than 
Whites in the United States, although there may be a crossover at later ages (Behrman, 
SickJes, Taubman, and Yazbeck, 1991 ; Chapman, LaPlante, and Wilensky, 1986; 
Kestenbaum, 1992; Kitagawa and Hauser, 1973; Sorlie, BackJund, and Keller, 1995; U.S. 
National Longitudinal Mortality Study, 1992). Race crossovers have long been an apparent 
trait of the U.S. life tables, although the point of crossover is floating upward. In the 1979-
1981 the White-Black crossovers occur at ages 84 for males and 85 for females, compared to 
ages 78 and 80 respectively for the White-Black crossovers in the 1969-1971 and ages 7 5 
and 77 respectively for the White-Nonwhite crossovers in the 1959-1961 (Kestenbaum, 
1992). 
Kitagawa and Hauser (1973) stated that both the male and the female curves cross at 
age 75 in the uncorrected rates; that is, Nonwhite death rates are higher than White death 
rates below age 75 but lower than White rates after age 75. The Nonwhite and white curves 
do not cross until the last open-ended age interval, 85 and over, when corrected for age 
reporting. This might be owing to older age of Whites more than Nonwhites, on the average, 
in this age interval. 
Chapman, LaPlante, and Wilensky ( 1986) revealed that Blacks suffer considerably 
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Table 4 . Period life table, 1994 
Male Female 
Exact Death Survival Life Death Survival Life 
age erobabilit;t: erobabilit;t: exeectanc;t: erobabilit;t: erobabilit;t: exeectanc;t: 
65 0.023662 0.976338000 15.28 0.013657 0.986343000 19.03 
66 0.026008 0.950945401 14.63 0.015016 0.97153207 4 18.29 
67 0.028279 0.924053616 14.01 0.016352 0.955645581 17.56 
68 0.030398 0.895964234 13.40 0.017622 0.938805195 16.84 
69 0.032489 0.866855252 12.81 0 .018902 0.921059899 16.14 
70 0.034789 0.836698225 12.22 0.020341 0.902324619 15.44 
71 0.037455 0.805359693 11 .64 0 .022027 0.882449115 14.75 
72 0.040474 0.772763565 11.08 0.023942 0.861321518 14.07 
73 0.043914 0.738828426 10.52 0.026122 0.838822078 13.40 
74 0.047794 0.703516860 9.98 0.028596 0.814835121 12.75 
75 0.052114 0.666853782 9.46 0.031441 0. 789215890 12.11 
76 0.056884 0.628920472 8.95 0.034639 0.761878241 11.48 
77 0.062152 0.589831807 8.46 0.038121 0.732834681 10.88 
78 0.067946 0.549755095 7.99 0.041882 0.702142099 10.29 
79 0.074303 0.508906642 7.54 0.046018 0 .669830924 9.72 
80 0.081277 0.467544237 7.10 0.050716 0 .635859778 9.16 
81 0.088889 0.425984697 6.69 0.056056 0.600216023 8.62 
82 0 .097131 0.384608377 6.29 0.061989 0 .563009232 8 .11 
83 0 .106017 0.343833351 5.91 0.068552 0 .524413823 7.61 
84 0 .115585 0.304091373 5.55 0.075824 0.484650669 7.13 
85 0 .125879 0.265812655 5.21 0.083897 0.443989932 6.68 
86 0 .136935 0.229413599 4.89 0.092852 0 .402764579 6.24 
87 0.148776 0.195282362 4.59 0.102748 0 .361381324 5.83 
88 0.161411 0.163761640 4.31 0.113628 0 .320318287 5.44 
89 0.1 74838 0.135129883 4.04 0.125510 0 .280115139 5.07 
90 0.189047 0.109583984 3.79 0.138406 0 .241345523 4.73 
91 0.204023 0.087226331 3.55 0.152315 0.204584979 4.41 
92 0.219745 0.068058781 3.34 0.167230 0.170372233 4.11 
93 0.236189 0.051984045 3.13 0.183140 0.1 39170263 3.64 
94 0.253327 0. 038815083 2.95 0.200023 0.111333009 3.59 
95 0.270566 0.028313041 2.78 0 .217175 0.087154263 3.36 
96 0.287756 0.020165794 2.63 0.234399 0.066725391 3.15 
97 0.304741 0.014020450 2.49 0.251481 0.049945223 2.96 
98 0.321353 0.009514936 2.36 0.268189 0.036550463 2.79 
99 0.337421 0.006304397 2.23 0 .284280 0.026159898 2.63 
100 0.354292 0.004070799 2.12 0 .301337 0.018276953 2.48 
Source: U.S. Social Security Administration, May 28, 1997. 
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higher mortality than Whites. In 1980, the age-adjusted mortality ratio for Black males 
compared to White males was l.18 and for Black females to White females, 1.49. For both 
Black males and females, mortality ratios are large at younger ages, but decline with 
increasingly older ages and actually cross below 1 for those over 75 years old. 
Behrman, Sickles, Taubman, and Yazbeck (1991) used the males in the Retirement 
History Survey, started in 1969 with about 11 ,000 men and women, to see how much of the 
observed inequality in mortality hazard rates (the age-specific death rate in a year t divided by 
the survivors in that age cohort up to time t) is eliminated once they control for certain 
observed variables. They found that the hazard is higher for Blacks at every age covered, 60-
66. In their research paper, there is no crossover in hazard rates for Blacks and Whites. 
Kestenbaum ( 1992) employed Medicare enrollment data from the Social Security 
Administration's Master Beneficiary Record to determine the mortality and size of the 
extreme aged population. The race crossover was present in his improved enrollment data 
file. His result provided strong support for the view that race crossover is a matter of fact. 
According to the death probabilities given in his paper, the crossovers in 1987 occurred at 
ages 86 for men and 88 for women. Actually, White female mortality exceeds Black female 
mortality at age 86, but Black female mortality again is higher at ages 87. Allowing some 
margin for error, he stated positively that White mortality exceeds Black mortality after age 
90. 
The U .S. National Longitudinal Mortality Study (1992) provided companson of 
tabulations that permitted the correction of official death statistics for the seven-year period 
1979-1985 for differences in the reporting of race on the death certificate and in the census. 
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The corrections had significant effect on the mortality indices of Whites and Blacks. For male 
ages 0-74, Blacks have a relatively high mortality. After ages 74, there is a marked inverse 
relationship between Black and White males. For females, the race crossover appears after 
ages 84. 
Sorile, Backlund, and Keller ( 1995) indicated Blacks less than 65 years of age had 
significantly higher age-adjusted mortality rates than Whites in the same age group. Blacks 
also in the 25-44 year group showed more than twice the rates of Whites, and those in the 
45-64 year group showed 1.5 fold higher rates. After adjustment for the other characteristics, 
the excess risk among Blacks was reduced but still considerably higher than that of Whites. In 
the 65+ age group, the multivariable adjusted mortality rates of Blacks were similar to, or 
even slightly lower than, those of Whites. 
Educational Attainment 
Higher education level was associated with lower mortality in males and females, with 
the strongest relationship in persons less than 65 years of age and much weaker association in 
the older age group (Feldman, Makuc, Kleinman, and Comoni-Huntley, 1989; Kitagawa and 
Hauser, 1973; Sorlie, Bucklund, and Keller, 1995; U.S. National Longitudinal Mortality 
Study, 1992). 
Kitagawa and Hauser ( 1973) interpreted that the range of the education differentials 
was much larger among persons 25-64 years of age than among older persons, and greater 
among women than men. For example, among White males 25-64 years old the mortality 
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ratios by education decreased consistently from a high of 1. 15 for males with less than 5 
years of schooling to a low of 0. 70 for males with at least 4 years of college, a differential of 
64 percent. In contrast to this, the education differential in mortality for White males 65 and 
over was only 4 percent (from 1.02 to 0.98). Among White females 25-64 years of age the 
mortaJity ratio of 1.60 for women with less than 5 years of schooling was 105 percent higher 
than the ratio of 0.78 for women with at least 4 years of college. On the other hand, for 
women aged 65 and over the ratio was only 67 percent (from 1.17 to 0. 70). Among 
Nonwhite 25-64 age years of age, males with less than 5 years of schooling had a mortality 
ratio (1.14) that was 31 percent higher than the ratio (0.87) for males with at least one year 
of high school. In this group females with less than 5 years of schooling had a mortality ratio 
(1.26) that was 70 percent higher than the ratio (0.74) for females who had at least one year 
of high school. 
Feldman, Makuc, Kleinman, and Comoni-Huntley (1989) explored educational 
differentials in mortality between 1960 and 1971-1984 for White males and females aged 55-
84 years at death. Their analysis was based on two national data sources, the 1960 Matched 
Records Study, a sample of all death records for 62,405 persons from May through August 
1960, and the National Heath and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES I) Epidemiologic 
Follow-up Study (NHEFS), which was used to estimate educational differentials in mortality 
for the period 1971-1984. They pointed out that there was little difference in mortality by 
educational level among middle-age and older men in 1960. Since 1960, death rates among 
men dropped more speedily for the more educated than the less educated, which resulted in 
meaningful educational differentials in mortality in 1971-1984. However, among women, the 
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inverse relation between education and mortality remained at about the same magnitude 
between 1960 and 1971-1984. 
The National Longitudinal Mortality Study (1992) showed that all-cause mortality 
levels tended to decline with increasing education for White and Black males ages 25-64. The 
inverse relationship was also seen for females ages 25-64 years, regardless of race. This 
relationship at ages 65 or older for males and females was not as strong as in the younger 
ages. 
Sorlie, Backlund, and Keller (1995) found that there were twofold to threefold 
defferences between the education with the highest (17+) and the lowest (0-4) risks for those 
less than 65 years of age. After adjustment for age and race, the ratio of the highest to the 
lowest risk diminished to between 1. 5 and 2. 
Income 
There is evidence of a strong inverse relationship between mortality rates and the 
scale of income differentials (Kitagawa, Hauser, 1973; Rodgers, 1979; U.S. National 
Longitudinal Mortality Study, 1992; Wilkinson, 1989). 
Kitagawa and Hauser (1973) reported that income was inversely related to mortality 
and the range of income differentials was much larger and the pattern more consistent among 
persons 25-64 years of age than among older persons. Among males of age 25-64 the 
mortality ratio of 1.51 for those from families with less than $2,000 income in 1959 was 80 
percent higher than the ratio of 0.84 for those from families with income of $10,000 or more. 
Comparable indices for White females in the 25-64 age group ranged from 1.20 for those 
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from families with less than $2,000 income to 0.86 for those from families with more than 
$I 0,000 income, a differential of 40 percent. After age 65, however, the mortality ratio for 
men from families with less than $2,000 income was only 15 percent higher than that for men 
from families with income of $8,000 of more. Among women 65 and over, there was no 
consistent pattern of declining mortality with increasing family income. Among White 
unrelated individuals 25-64 years of age, there also was a strong inverse association between 
mortality and income. Among White unrelated individuals over 65 years of age, there was no 
indication of an inverse association between mortality and income for men, although women 
did maintain a differential of 3 I percent. 
The U.S. National Longitudinal Mortality Study (1992) stated that mortality ratios 
from all causes of death in White males ages 25-64 with family incomes of less than $5,000 
per year were 2.71 times the ratios in men with incomes of $50,000 or more per year. For 
White females ages 25-64, mortality ratios from all causes of death with family incomes of 
Jess than $5,000 per year were more 2.17 times than the ratios in women with incomes of 
$50,000 or more per year. For Black males ages 25-64, mortality ratios from all causes of 
death with family incomes of less than $5,000 per year were more l.91 times than the ratios 
in men with incomes of $50,000 or more per year. For Black females ages 25-64, mortality 
ratios from all causes of death with family incomes of less than $5,000 per year were 2.68 
times the ratios in women with incomes of $50,000 or more per year. After age 65, all 
mortality ratios reduced dramatically (2.71-l.44, 2.17-1.10, 1.91-1.23, and 2.68-0.88). 
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BIAS IN THE CONSUMER PRICE INDEX 
Beginning in 1975, automatic benefit increases, also known as a cost-of-living 
adjustment or COLA, have been in effect in Social Security program. The purpose of the 
COLA is to maintain a recipient's benefit level at a constant real value, or purchasing power, 
from age of retirement to age of death. After 1982, the COLA becomes effective with the 
January benefit payment. It is equal to the percentage increase in the Consumer Price lndex 
for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers (CPI-W) between the third quarter of the 
previous year and the corresponding third quarter one year earlier. Until 1985 there was a 
trigger requirement such that the COLA would not be given if the CPI increase is less than 
3.0 percent. For example, this provision had been in effect in 1985-87, and the CPI rose by 
only 1.3 percent from the third quarter of 1985 to the third quarter of 1986, the latter would 
not be a base quarter. If rise measured from the third quarter of 1985 to the third quarter of 
1987 were 5.5 percent, the latter would be the new base quarter, and benefits would be 
increased by this amount, beginning with December 1987, including those for new eligibles in 
1987. 
In 1994, the Congressional Budget Office stated that the budgetary effect of any 
overestimates of changes in the cost of living creates the possibility of a shift in the 
distribution of wealth. If the CPI has an upward bias, some federal programs would 
overcompensate for the effect of price changes on living standards, and wealth would be 
transferred from younger and future generations to current recipients of indexed federal 
programs. In short, the upward bias programs into the federal budget every year an 
2 1 
automatic real increase in indexed benefits and a real income tax cut. Correction of bias in 
' 
the CPI, while designed to adjust benefits and taxes for true changes in the cost of living 
more accurately, would also contribute importantly to reductions in future federal budget 
deficits and the national debt (Advisory Commission to Study the CPI, 1996). Table 5 
displays recent estimates of bias in the U.S. Consumer Price Index. 
Table 5. Recent estimates of bias in the U.S. Consumer Price Index 
Authors 
Advisory Commission to Study the CPI (1996) 
Michael Boskin (1995) 
Congressional Budget Office (1994) 
Michael R. Darby (1995) 
W. Erwin Diewert (1995) 
Federal Reserve Board 
Robert J. Gordon (1995) 
Alan Greenspan (1995) 
Ziv Griliches ( 1995) 
Dale W. Jorgenson (1995) 
Jim I<Jumpner ( 1996) 
Lebow, Roberts and Stockton (1994) 
Ariel Pakes (1995) 
Shapiro and Wilcox ( 1996) 
Wynne and Sigalla (1994) 
Point estimate 
1.1 
1.5 
l.5 
1.7 
1.0 
1.0 
0.8 
1.0 
less than 1.0 
Interval estimate 
0.8-1.6 
1.0-2.0 
0.2-0.8 
0.5-2.5 
1.3-1.7 
0.4-1 .5 
0.5-1.5 
0.4-1.6 
0.5-1 .5 
0.3-0.5 
0.4-1.5 
0.6-1.5 
Source: Brent R. Moulton, Bias in the Consumer Price Index: What Is the Evidence? 
In Journal ofEconomic Perspectives, Fall 1996, pp160. 
Abraham ( l 995a) and D ' Amato (1995) concluded that a one percent increase in the 
index produces an increase in outlays and a decline in revenues for the federal government 
which, jointly, add approximately between $6 billion and $6.5 billion to the federal deficit due 
to the CPI used to adjust such things as Social Security benefits and income tax brackets. 
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Boskin (1995) estimated that correcting the overindexation by one percentage point 
per annum would reduce the federal budget deficit by about $70 billion in the year 2002, and 
by over $200 billion cumulatively for the next seven years. 
Gordon ( 1995) concluded that the federal budget deficit would be reduced over the 
next decade by hundreds of billion of dollars if the rate of inflation used to escalate Social 
Security benefits, tax brackets, exemptions, and the standard deduction were to be reduced 
by one percent below the forecast growth in the official CPI. 
Greenspan ( 1995) concluded that the annual level of the deficit would be lower by 
about $55 billion after five years if annual inflation adjustments to indexed programs and 
taxes were reduced by one percentage point. The cumulative deficit reduction over this 
period would be nearly $150 billion, and these savings would continue to grow in subsequent 
years. 
Jorgenson (1995) estimated that the bias produced an increase of 3.42 percent in 
federal outlays of$1.5 trillion in fiscal 1995 or $50 billion between 1968 to 1982. 
McLennan (1995) assumed that the CPI overstates the rate of inflation by one 
percent. Eliminating this bias could result in a savings to the federal government of $150 
billion over five years. That would reduce the federal budget deficit currently projected for 
the year 2000 by $55 billion, about one-quarter of the total. 
O'Neill (1995) showed that tax collections would be close to $10 billion higher and 
spending would be $13 billion lower than the Congressional Budget Office currently projects 
by the year 2000 if the CPI grew 0.5 percentage points slower than the CBO budget baseline 
assumes from 1996 through 2000. 
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Freedman (1996) stated that the cumulative outstanding federal debt would be 
reduced by an estimated $634.3 billion in the next decade if such a one percent discount were 
applied. 
The Advisory Commission to Study the CPI ( 1996) reported that this bias would 
contribute about $148 billion to the deficit in 2006 and $691 billion to the national debt 
estimated by the CBO if the change in the CPI overstated the change in the cost of living by 
an average of 1.1 percentage points per year over the next decade. By 2008, these totals 
reach $202 billion and $1 .07 trillion, respectively. 
Commodity Substitution Bias 
One reason for this upward bias is that the CPI does not reflect changes in buying or 
consumption patterns that consumers would be expected to make as they adjust to relative 
price changes, buying more of goods whose relative prices have fallen and less of goods 
those relative prices have risen (Abraham, 1995b; Advisory Commission to Study the CPI, 
1996; Baskin, 1995; Darby, 1995; Diewert, 1995; Fixler, 1993; Freedman, 1996; Gordon, 
1995; Marcoot, 1985; McLennan, 1995; Moulton, 1996; Norwood, 1995; O'Neill, 1995; 
Pakes, 1995; Pollak, 1995). Most estimates cluster around 0.2 to 0.25 percent per year, for 
example, Boskin (0.2), Gordon (0.25), O'Neill (0.2), and Pakes (0.2). The latest estimate 
available was about 0.15 percentage point per year adopted by Advisory Commission to 
Study the CPI in December 1996. 
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Formula Bias 
The base price for the sample item should represent its average price during the 
expenditure base period. Because the sample item had not yet been selected during the base 
period, neither the base price nor the base period quantity is observable, and a method is 
required for estimating the base price. From 1978 until 1996, the BLS took the price of the 
sample item during the sample replacement, and deflated it to the base period using the 
overall price index for the stratum. This procedure causes items that are on sale or otherwise 
have an unusually low price when they are introduced to the sample to receive a 
disproportionately large weight because the expendjture weight is divided by an atypically 
low base price for the item on sale. The net effect is that the estimator may apply too much 
weight to price increases and too little weight to price decreases immediately after the 
introduction of a new sample or a new sample item (Abraham, l 995b; Advisory Commjssion 
to Study the CPI, 1996; Boskin, 1995; Diewert, 1995; Gordon, 1995; Moulton, 1996; Pollak, 
1995). A numerical example from Boskin (1995), if the price of a srurt, which was originally 
$50, goes on sale at $40. It is calculated as a 20 percent reduction. Now the sale ends and the 
price goes back to its original level, $50. That is calculated as a 25 percent increase. Clearly, 
over the two periods there has been no price change. But the methodology of the CPI results 
in an estimate of a +5 percent change in price (-20 percent plus 25 percent equal +5 percent). 
The upward bias for the total CPI was estimated 0.5 percent by Boskin (1995) and 0.35 
percent by Gordon (1995). 
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Outlet Substitution Bias 
The outlet substitution effect can arise because consumers are free to substitute where 
they buy goods and services as well as what goods they buy. For instance, if consumers do 
not consider the lower level of customer service provided by a discount store to be of any 
consequence, they may shift to such stores and experience no loss of well-being. Current CPI 
procedures would not capture any price decline associated with such a shift (Abraham, 
I 995b; Advisory Commission to Study the CPI, 1996; Bosk:in, 1995; Diewert, 1995; 
Freedman, 1996; Gordon, 1995; Moulton, 1996; Norwood, 1995; O'Neill, 1995; Pakes, 
1995; Pollak, 1995). The upward bias for the total CPI was assessed 0.3 percent by Bosk:in 
(1995), 0.5 percent by Gordon (1995), and 0.1 percent by O'NeiU (1995). 
Quality Change 
In the real world, goods and services change over time. The BLS uses vanous 
techniques to try to capture changes in the characteristics of goods and services and translate 
these changes into "equivalent" price changes. Not all quality changes are improvements, of 
course, but surely most changes in the quality of goods and services unrecognized by the 
BLS have been improvements and the net bias from that source may be upward (Advisory 
Commission to Study the CPI, 1996; Boskin, 1995; Darby, 1995; Diewert, 1995; Freedman, 
1996; Gordon, 1995; Kokoski, 1993; McLennan, 1995; Moulton, 1996; Norwood, 1995; 
O'NeiU, 1995; Pollak, 1995). According to previous evaluations of quality change bias, this 
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bias was estimated 0.5 percent by Boslcin (1995), 0.6 percent by Gordon (1995), and 0.2-1.0 
percent by O'Neill (1995). 
New Goods 
In our dynamic economy new goods come into the consumer marketplace virtually 
continuously. Sometimes new goods provide a service similar to an existing good, but with 
higher quality or a lower price. In other cases, new goods offer an additional variety of 
choices but without fundamentally changing the services provided. Finally, some new goods 
provide entirely new services that were previously unavailable. For the CPI, the appearance 
of new goods presents at least two important problems: bring new goods into the samples on 
a timely basis; and accounting for differences in price between new goods and the old goods 
that provided the same or similar services (Moulton, 1996). New goods bias occurs when 
new products are not introduced in the market basket, or included only with a long lag 
(Advisory Commission to Study the CPI, 1996; Armknecht, Lane, and Stewart, 1997; Darby, 
1995; Diewert, 1995; Moulton, 1996; Pakes, 1995). Diewert (1995) made a conservative 
range of estimates, 0.35-0.6 percent, for the linlcing bias and the new goods bias in the U.S. 
CPI in recent years. Advisory Commission to Study the CPI ( 1996) estimated that the bias 
for quality change and new goods was 0.6 percent per year. 
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THE EFFECT OF THE ANNUAL COST-OF-LIVING 
ADJUSTMENT ON SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS 
Low Earnings, Average Earnings, and High Earnings 
Table 6 iJlustrates the PIA and monthly benefit for someone retiring m 1995. 
Retirement at age 65 means at exact age 65 and 0 months. Low earnings are defined as 
earnings equal to 45 percent of the national average wage index. Average earnings are 
defined as earnings equal to the national average wage index. High earnings are defined as 
earnings equal to 160 percent of the national average wage index. 
Table 6. Illustrative benefit table for workers, retiring in 1995, with low earnings, average 
earnings, and high earnings 
Earnings level Average Indexed 
Monthly Earnings 
Low Earnings 
Average Earnings 
High Earnings 
796.00 
1,770.00 
2,600.00 
Primary Insurance 
Amount 
520.30 
858.90 
1,098.20 
Source: Social Security Administration, http://www.ssa.gov 
Normal Retirement Age (NRA) 
Monthly benefit 
520.00 
858.00 
1,098.00 
An individual is eligible for a monthly old-age insurance benefit at age 62 or later if 
fully insured. The amount of this benefit is I 00 percent of the primary insurance amount 
(PIA), except in the case of a worker first claiming benefits before the Nonnal Retirement 
Age and except for defennent of retirement beyond the NRA. From U.S. Congress, House 
Committee on Ways and Means (1992), the scheduled NRA is 65 years old between 1994 
and 2002. Table 7 shows the Normal Retirement Age for workers and spouses born after 
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Table 7. Normal Retirement Age for workers and spouses born after 1928. 
Birth date Year cohort turns 65 Full retirement age 
1/2/29-1/1/30 1994 65 years 
1/2/30-1/1/31 1995 65 years 
1/2/31-1/1/32 1996 65 years 
1/2/32-1 / 1133 1997 65 years 
112/33-1/1/34 1998 65 years 
1/2/34-1/1/35 1999 65years 
1/2/35-1/1/36 2000 65 years 
1/2/36-1/ 1/37 2001 65 years 
1/2/37-1/1/38 2002 65 years 
1/2/38-1/1/39 2003 65 years and 2 months 
1/2/39-111/40 2004 65 years and 4 months 
112/40-1/1 /41 2005 65 years and 6 months 
1/2/41-1/1 /42 2006 65 years and 8 months 
1/2/42-1 / 1143 2007 65 years and 10 months 
1/2/43-1/ 1155 2008-2019 66 years 
112/55-1/1/56 2020 66 years and 2 months 
1/2/56-1/1/57 2021 66 years and 4 months 
1/2/57-1/1/58 2022 66 years and 6 months 
112/58-1/1/59 2023 66 years and 8 months 
1/2/59-1/1/60 2024 66 years and 10 months 
1/2/60 and later 2025 67 years 
Source: Social Security Handbook, Section 723, 1997. 
1928. 
Benefit Adjustments for Early and Delayed Retirement 
Insurance against earnings loss is one of many forms of insurance characterized by 
"moral hazard," a problem encountered whenever the insured can influence the probability 
that the insured event will occur. Without proper safeguards, a worker could collect benefits 
simply by ceasing to work. To counter moral hazard, the OASI system imposes on workers a 
minimum retirement age of 62, exacts benefit reductions for early retirement, and grants 
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additional benefits for delayed retirement beyond the NormaJ Retirement Age (Meyer and 
Wolff, 1993). 
A retirement insurance benefit is reduced by 5/9 of 1 percent (or 1/180) for each 
month of entitlement before age 65 . Beginning with the year 2003, the retirement age 
increases gradually from age 65 until it reaches age 67 in the year 2025. An additional 
reduction applies to Primary Insurance Benefits based on the additionaJ reduction period. 
Retirement insurance benefits are reduced by 5/12 of I percent for each month of reduction 
in excess of 36 months. This applies to individuals whose Normal Retirement Age is after age 
65. 
The Delayed Retirement Credit (DRC) increases the benefit amount for certain 
individuaJs who did not receive benefits for months after attainment of age 65. For a person 
attaining age 65 before 1982, this beneficiary receives an increase equal to 1 /12 of 1 percent 
of the benefit for each increment month. For a person attaining age 65 after 1981 and before 
1990, this beneficiary receives an increase equaJ 1/4 of 1 percent of the benefit for each 
increment month. For person attaining age 65 after 1989, this beneficiary's benefit amount is 
increased for each increment month at rate of 1/4 of 1 percent, plus 1/24 of 1 percent for 
each even-numbered year from 1990 through 2008 in which the beneficiary is NRA or older. 
Table 8 displays the Delayed Retirement Credit rates. 
Table 9 presents scheduled changes in adjustments for early and delayed retirement. 
In short, for a worker attaining 65 in 1995, the reduction for starting his or her SociaJ 
Security benefits at age 62 is 20 percent; at age 63, it is 13 .33 percent; and at age 64, it is 
6.67 percent. In contrast to the benefit reduction for early retirement, his or her Social 
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Table 8. Delayed Retirement Credit rates 
Attain age 65 monthly ~ercentage Yearly ~ercentage 
Prior to 1982 1/12of1% 1% 
1982-1989 1/4of1% 3% 
1990-1991 7/24 of1% 3.5% 
1992-1993 1/3 of 1% 4% 
1994-1995 3/8of1% 4.5% 
1996-1997 5/12of1% 5% 
1998-1999 11/24of1% 5.5% 
2000-2001 1/2of1% 6% 
2002-2003 13/24of1% 6.5% 
2004-2005 7/12of1% 7% 
2006-2007 5/8of1% 7.5% 
2008 or later 2/3of1% 8% 
Source: Social Security Handbook, Section 720, 1997. 
Table 9. Scheduled changes in adjustments for early and delayed retirement 
Birth date Benefit as a percentage of PIA, if retirement age is 
62 63 64 65 66 67 70 
1/2/29-1/1/30 80.00% 86.67% 93 .33% 100.% 104.5% 109.0% 122.5% 
112/30-111131 80.00 86.67 93.33 100.0 104.50 109.00 122.50 
112/3 1-1/ l/3 2 80.00 86.67 93 .33 100.0 105.00 110.00 125.00 
1/2/32-1/1/33 80.00 86.67 93 .33 100.0 105.00 110.00 125.00 
112/33-1/1/34 80.00 86.67 93.33 100.0 105.50 111.00 127.50 
1/2/34-1/1/35 80.00 86.67 93.33 100.0 105.50 111.00 127.50 
112/35-1/1/36 80.00 86.67 93 .33 100.0 106.00 112.00 130.00 
112/36-1/1/3 7 80.00 86.67 93.33 100.0 106.00 112.00 130.00 
1/2/37-1/1/38 80.00 86.67 93 .33 100.0 106.5 113.00 132.50 
1/2/38-1/1/39 79.17 85.56 92.22 98.89 105.42 111.92 131.42 
1/2/39-1/1/40 78.33 84.44 91.11 97.78 104.64 111.67 132.67 
1/2/40-1/1/41 77.50 83 .33 90.00 96.67 103.50 110.50 131.50 
1/2/41-1/1/42 76.67 82.22 88.89 95.56 102.50 110.00 132.50 
1/2/42-1 /1/43 75.83 81.11 87.78 94.44 101.25 108.75 131.25 
1/2/43-1/1/55 75.00 80.00 86.67 93 .33 100.00 108.00 132.00 
1/2/55-111/56 74.17 79.17 85.56 92.22 98.89 106.67 130.67 
1/2/56-1/1/57 73 .33 78.33 84.44 91.11 97.78 105.33 129.33 
1/2/57-1/1/58 72.50 77.50 83 .33 90.00 96.67 104.00 128.00 
1/2/58-1/1/59 71.67 76.67 82.22 88.89 95.56 102.67 126.67 
1/2/59-1/J/60 70.83 75.83 81.11 87.78 94.44 101.33 125.33 
1 /2/60 and later 70.00 75.00 80.00 86.67 93 .33 100.00 124.00 
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Security benefits increases 9 percent if the worker retires at age 67; it is 22.5 percent if the 
worker retires at age 70. 
Spousal and Survivors Benefits 
A husband (or wife) of any insured worker is eligible, upon reaching age 65, to 
receive a "spousal benefit" equal to 50 percent of the worker' s PIA. If the insured worker 
dies, a widowed spouse aged 65 or older may receive a "survivors benefit," which equals l 00 
percent of the worker' s PIA. Spouses and survivors who retire before age 65 are eligible to 
receive a reduced benefit. The rules governing these benefits apply equally to males and 
females, but the vast majority of these supplementary benefits currently go to retired wives 
and widows (Steuerle and Bakija, 1994). 
Wife's and husband ' s insurance benefits are reduced by 25/36 of I percent (or 1/144) 
for each month of entitlement before age 65. In addition, spouse' s benefits are reduced by 
5/1 2 of I percent for each month of reduction in excess of 36 months. This applies to 
individuals whose the NRA is after age 65. Table I 0 displays scheduled changes in the NRA 
and adjustments for spousal benefits. For example, for a worker attaining 65 in 1995, his or 
her spouse begins collecting benefits at 64, the benefit amount would be about 45.84 percent 
(91.67%*0.5= 45.835%) of the worker's full benefit. At age 63, it would be about 41.67 
percent (83.33% *0.5= 41 .665%), and 37.5 percent (75%*0. 5= 37.5%) at age 62. 
The procedure is entirely different for the widow's and widower's benefit because the 
factor of 71 . 5 percent for age 60 remains fixed , and the factors for ages at claim between age 
60 and the NRA are obtained by linear interpolation (Myers, 1993). For instance, when the 
32 
Table 10. Scheduled changes in the NRA and adjustments for seousal benefits 
Birth date the NRA for spouse's Benefit as a percentage of PIA, if retirement 
benefits age1s 
62 63 64 65 
Before l/l /38 65 years 75.00% 83 .33% 91.67% 100.0% 
1/2/38-1 /1/39 65 years and 2 months 74. 17 81 .94 90.28 98.61 
] /2/39-1/1/40 65 years and 4 months 73.33 80.56 88.89 97.22 
1/2/40-1 / 1/4 1 65 years and 6 months 72.50 79.17 87.50 95 .83 
1/2/41-111/42 65 years and 8 months 71.67 77.78 86. 11 94.44 
112142-111143 65 years and 10 70.83 76.39 84.72 93.06 
months 
1/2/43-1/1 /55 66 years 70.00 75.00 83.33 91.67 
112155-111156 66 years and 2 months 69.17 74.17 81 .94 90.28 
112/56- 1/1/57 66 years and 4 months 68.33 73 .33 80.56 88.89 
1/2/57-1/1/58 66 years and 6 months 67.50 72.50 79.17 87.50 
1/2/58-1/1 /59 66 years and 8 months 66.67 71.67 77.78 86.11 
112159-111160 66 years and I 0 65.83 70.83 76.39 84.72 
months 
1/2/60 and 67 years 65.00 70.00 75.00 83 .33 
later 
NRA is 66, the factor for exact age 63 is 85.75 percent (three-sixths of the way between 71.5 
percent and 100 percent) . Similarly, when the NRA is 67, the factor for age 63 is 83 .71 
percent (three-sevenths of the way between 71.5 percent and 100 percent). In addition, the 
NRA for the widow' s and widower's benefits is determined in a slightly different manner than 
that for retired workers and spouses (Myers, 1993 ). Table 11 presents scheduled changes in 
the NRA and adjustments for survivors benefits. 
At retirement, many married and divorced workers become dually entitled to primary 
benefits. For example, a spouse is often entitled to a benefit based on his or her own earnings 
record, as well as for being the spouse or survivor of an insured worker. In this case, the 
spouse can receive an amount equal to the larger of the two available benefits. 
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Table 11 . Scheduled changes in the NRA and adjustments for survivors benefits 
Birth date the NRA for the Benefit as a percentage of PIA, if retirement 
widow( er) ' s benefits age is 
62 63 64 65 
Before 1/1/41 65 years 82.90% 88.60% 94.30% 100.0% 
1/2/40-1/1 /41 65 years and 2 months 82.53 88.04 93.56 99.08 
1/2/41-111142 65 years and 4 months 82.19 87.53 92.88 98.22 
1/2/42-1 / 1143 65 years and 6 months 81 .86 87.05 92.23 97.41 
112/43-1/1 /44 65 years and 8 months 81.56 86.59 91.62 96.65 
1/2/44-111/45 65 years and I 0 months 81.27 86.16 91 .04 95.93 
1/2/45-1 /1/57 66 years 81 .00 85.75 90.50 95.25 
1/2/57-1/ 1158 66 years and 2 months 80.74 85.36 89.99 94.61 
1/2/58-1/1/59 66 years and 4 months 80.50 85.00 89.50 94.00 
1 /2/59-111/60 66 years and 6 months 80.27 84.65 89.04 93 .42 
112/60-1/1 /61 66 years and 8 months 80.05 84.33 88.60 92.88 
112/61-1/ 1/62 66 years and l 0 months 79.84 84.01 88.18 92.35 
1/2/62 and 67 years 79.64 83.71 87.79 91.86 
later 
The maximum family benefit restriction is placed on the total amount of benefits that 
can be paid in any month to a worker and to his or her dependents or survivors based on that 
worker's earnings record. In 1997, the family maximum ranges from 150 percent of PIA for 
workers with low earnings to a maximum of 182.12 percent in midrange, decreasing to 
175.03 percent of PIA for workers with high earnings. Benefit awards may exceed the family 
maximum if the worker qualifies for a delayed retirement credit since the credit is excluded 
from the maximum benefit amount (Meyer and Wolff, 1993). 
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Simulations 
The Expected Consumer Price index And Average Annual Interest Rate 
The data quoted from 1996 OASDI Trustees Report, Table II.D 1. are the estimated 
intermediate level changes for the CPI and the average annual interest rate. The Consumer 
Price Index is the annual average value for the calendar year of the Consumer Price Index for 
Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers (CPI-W). The average annual interest rate is the 
average of the nominal interest rates, which, in practice, are compounded semiannually, for 
special public-debt obligations issuable to the trust funds in each of the 12 months of the year. 
To adjust for the upward bias of the CPI, I cite an average of 1.1 percentage points reported 
by Advisory Commission to Study the CPI ( 1996) as an adjusted factor. 
Cumulative rate of the unadjusted CPI (CPI-UA) is 
35 
(CPI-UA)1 = II (l +At) 
t= I 
At = the percentage change CPI in year t 
t = 1 ::::> the CPI in 1996 
t=35 ::::> the CPI in 2030 
Cumulative rate of the adjusted CPI (CPI-A) is 
JS 
(CPI-A)1 = II (l+At-1.1%) 
1- 1 
At = the percentage change CPI in year t 
35 
t = 1 =>the CPI in 1996 
t=35 =>the CPI in 2030 
Cumulative rate of average annual interest rate (IR-C) is 
35 
(IR-C)1 = TI ( 1 +B,) 
t= I 
B1 = the average annual interest rate in year t 
t = I => the average annual interest rate in 1996 
t=35 => the average annual interest rate in 2030 
Table 12 displays the calculation results. 
Survival Probability 
A unique set of survival probabilities is used for each sex and cohort, based on 
mortality tables published by the Social Security Administration in 1997; see the totals in 
Table 4 . Unfortunately, mortality tables that differentiate among people with respect to 
socioeconomic differentials are not available for each cohort although there is evidence that 
socioeconomic differentials have a significant effect on life expectancy. Survival probability, 
year t, is given by 
35 
S1 = TI {l-d1) 
t=O 
d1 = the probability of death rate in age t 
t=O => the probability of death rate in age 65 
t=3 5 => the probability of death rate in age 100 
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Table 12. The calculation results of CPI, CPI-UA, CPI-A, IR, and IR-C 
Year CPI CPl-UA CPl-C CPI-A IR IR-C 
1995 
1996 2.90% 1.02900000 1.80% 1.01800000 6.40% 1.064000000 
1997 3.20% 1.06192800 2.10% 1.03937800 6.50% 1.133160000 
1998 3.20% 1.09590970 2.10% 1.06120494 6.50% 1.206815400 
1999 3.40% 1.13317063 2.30% 1.08561265 6.50% 1.285258401 
2000 3.50% 1.17283160 2.40% 1.11166736 6.50% 1.368800197 
2001 3.60% 1.21505354 2.50% 1.13945904 6.50% 1.457772210 
2002 3.90% 1.26244062 2.80% 1.17136389 6 .50% 1.552527404 
2003 4.00% 1.31293825 2.90% 1.20533345 6.50% 1.653441685 
2004 4.00% 1.36545578 2.90% 1.24028811 6.50% 1. 760915394 
2005 4.00% 1.42007401 2.90% 1.27625647 6.40% 1.873613979 
2006 4.00% 1.47687697 2.90% 1.31326791 6.40% 1 . 99352527 4 
2007 4.00% 1.53595205 2.90% 1.35135268 6 .40% 2.121110892 
2008 4.00% 1.59739013 2.90% 1.39054190 6 .40% 2.256861989 
2009 4.00% 1.66128574 2.90% 1.43086762 6 .40% 2.401301156 
2010 4.00% 1.72773716 2.90% 1.47236278 6.30% 2.552583129 
2011 4.00% 1.79684665 2.90% 1.51506130 6.30% 2. 713395866 
2012 4.00% 1.86872052 2.90% 1.55899808 6.30% 2.884339806 
2013 4.00% 1.94346934 2.90% 1.60420902 6.30% 3.066053213 
2014 4.00% 2.02120811 2.90% 1.65073109 6.30% 3.259214566 
2015 4.00% 2.10205644 2.90% 1.69860229 6.30% 3.464545083 
2016 4.00% 2.18613869 2.90% 1.74786175 6.30% 3.682811424 
2017 4.00% 2.27358424 2.90% 1.79854974 6.30% 3.914828543 
2018 4.00% 2.36452761 2.90% 1.85070769 6.30% 4.161462742 
2019 4.00% 2.45910872 2.90% 1.90437821 6 .30% 4.423634894 
2020 4.00% 2.55747306 2.90% 1.95960518 6 .30% 4. 702323893 
2021 4.00% 2.65977199 2.90% 2.01643373 6 .30% 4.998570298 
2022 4.00% 2.76616287 2.90% 2.07491031 6.30% 5.313480227 
2023 4.00% 2.87680938 2.90% 2.13508270 6.30% 5.648229481 
2024 4.00% 2.99188176 2.90% 2.19700010 6.30% 6.004067938 
2025 4.00% 3.11155703 2.90% 2.26071311 6.30% 6 .382324218 
2026 4.00% 3.23601931 2.90% 2.32627379 6.30% 6.784410644 
2027 4.00% 3.36546008 2.90% 2.39373573 6.30% 7.211828515 
2028 4.00% 3.50007848 2.90% 2.46315406 6.30% 7.666173711 
2029 4.00% 3.64008162 2.90% 2.53458553 6.30% 8.149142655 
2030 4.00% 3.78568489 2.90% 2.60808851 6.30% 8.662538642 
Source: 1996 OASDI Trustees Report, Table II.DI . 
Note: (CPI) 1 = the estimated CPI in intermediate level 
(CPI-C) I= (CPI) 1 - 1.1 % 
(CPI-UA) 1 = cumulative rate of the unadjusted CPI 
(CPI-A) 1 =cumulative rate of the adjusted CPI 
(IR) 1 =the estimated average annual interest rate in intermediate level 
(IR-C) 1 = cumulative rate of average annual interest rate 
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Results 
To see how the system treats people of different income level, I examine three levels: 
low earnings (LE), average earnings (AE), and high earnings (HE). To illustrate the effects of 
the COLA, I use the CPI-UA and CPI-A to calculate annual benefit for each income level. 
Table 13 demonstrates how the expected annual benefit varies for retirement workers 
turning 65 in 1995. For example, in 2010, for an individual with low earnings, his or her 
expected annual benefit will be $10,781.08 with the CPI-UA and $9,187.54 with the CPI-A, 
respectively. 
The Social Security beneficiaries receive their benefits paid by SSA monthly. Because 
it is very difficult to get the mortality rate by month for each age, I use the expected annual 
benefit instead of the expected monthly benefit to examine the effect of sex differential in 
mortality. Table 14 and Table 15 present the expected annual benefit values for retirement 
workers turning 65 in 1995 with male and female survival probabilities by age. For low-
eaming males surviving to age 80, their expected annual benefit will be $5,040.63 with the 
CPI-UA and $4,295.58 with the CPI-A, respectively. The expected annual benefit will be 
reduced by $745.05. For low-earning females surviving to age 80, their expected annual 
benefit will be $6,855.26 with the CPI-UA and $5,841.99 with the CPI-A, respectively. The 
expected annual benefit will be reduced by $1013.27. Due to different survival probabilities 
between males and females, the differences in the expected annual benefit are $1,814.63 with 
the CPI-UA and $1,546.41 with the CPI-A. 
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Table 13 . Expected annual benefit for retirement workers turning 65 in 1995 
Year LE LE-65 LE-65C AE AE-65 AE-65C HE HE-65 HE-65C 
1995 6,240.00 6,240.00 6,240.00 10,296.00 10,296.00 10,296.00 13, 176.00 13, 176.00 13, 176.00 
1996 6,240.00 6,420.96 6,352.32 10,296.00 10,594.58 10,481 .33 13,176.00 13,558.10 13,413.17 
1997 6,240.00 6,626.43 6,485.72 10,296.00 10,933.61 10,701 .44 13.176.00 13,991 .96 13,694.64 
1998 6,240.00 
1999 6,240.00 
2000 6,240.00 
2001 6,240.00 
2002 6.240.00 
2003 6,240.00 
2004 6,240.00 
6,838.48 
7,070.98 
7,318.47 
7,581 .93 
7 ,8n.63 
8,192.73 
8,520.44 
6,621 .92 10,296.00 11 ,283.49 10,926.17 13,176.00 14,439.71 13,982.44 
6,n4.22 10.296.oo 11 .667.12 11 .177.47 13,176.oo 14,930.66 14,304.03 
6,936.80 10,296.00 12,075.47 11 ,445.73 13,176.00 15,453.23 14,647.33 
7, 110.22 10,296.00 12,510.19 11,731 .87 13, 176.00 16,009.55 15,013.51 
7,309.31 10,296.00 12,998.09 12,060.36 13,176.00 16,633.92 15,433.89 
7,521 .28 10,296.00 13,518.01 12,410.11 13,176.00 17,299.27 15,881 .47 
7,739.40 10.296.oo 14,058.73 12,no.01 13.176.oo 17,991.25 16,342.04 
2005 6,240.00 8,861 .26 7,963.64 10,296.00 14,621 .08 13,140.34 13,176.00 18,710.90 16,815.96 
2006 6,240.00 9,215.71 8,194.79 10,296.00 15,205.93 13,521.41 13,176.00 19,459.33 17,303.62 
2007 6,240.00 9,564.34 8,432.44 10,296.00 15,814.16 13,913.53 13,176.00 20,237.70 17,805.42 
2008 6,240.00 9,967.71 8,676.98 10,296.00 16,446.73 14,317.02 13,176.00 21 ,047.21 18,321 .78 
2009 6,240.00 10,366.42 8,928.61 10,296.00 17,104.60 14,732.21 13,176.00 21 ,889.10 18,853.11 
2010 6,240.00 10,781 .08 9,187.54 10,296.00 17,788.78 15,159.45 13,176.00 22,764.66 19,399.85 
2011 6,240.00 11 ,212.32 9,453.98 10,296.00 18,500.33 15,599.07 13,176.00 23,675.25 19,962.45 
2012 6,240.00 11,660.82 9,728.1 5 10,296.00 19,240.35 16,051.44 13,1 76.00 24,622.26 20,541.36 
2013 6,240.00 12, 127.25 10,010.26 10,296.00 20,009.96 16,516.94 13, 176.00 25,607.15 21 , 137.06 
2014 6,240.00 12,612.34 10,300.56 10,296.00 20,810.36 16,995.93 13,176.00 26,631 .44 21,750.03 
2015 6,240.oo 13,116.83 10,599.28 10,296.00 21,642.n 17,488.81 13,176.oo 27.696.70 22,380.78 
2016 6,240.00 13,641.51 10,906.66 10,296.00 22,508.48 17,995.98 13,176.00 28,804.56 23,029.83 
2017 6,240.00 14,187.17 11 ,222.95 10,296.00 23,408.82 18,517.87 13,176.00 29,956.75 23,697.69 
2018 6,240.00 14,754.65 11 ,548.42 10,296.00 24,345.18 19,054.89 13,176.00 31 ,155.02 24,364.92 
2019 6,240.00 15,344.64 11,883.32 10,296.00 25,318.98 19,607.48 13,176.00 32,401 .22 25,092.09 
2020 6,240.00 15,958.63 12.227.94 10,296.00 26,331 .74 20,176.09 13,176.00 33,697.27 25,819.76 
2021 6,240.00 16,596.98 12,582.55 10,296.00 27,385.01 20,761 .20 13,176.00 35,045.16 26,568.53 
2022 6,240.00 17,260.86 12,947.44 10,296.00 28,480.41 21,363.28 13,176.00 36,446.96 27,339.02 
2023 6,240.00 17,951 .29 13,322.92 10,296.00 29,619.63 21 ,982.81 13,176.00 37,904.64 28,131.85 
2024 6,240.00 18,669.34 13,709.28 10,296.00 30,804.41 22,620.31 13,176.00 39,421 .03 28,947.67 
2025 6,240.00 19,416.12 14,1 06.85 10,296.00 32,036.59 23,276.30 13,176.00 40,997.88 29,787.16 
2026 6,240.00 20,192.76 14,515.95 10,296.00 33,318.05 23,951.31 13,176.00 42,637.79 30,650.98 
2027 6,240.00 21,000.47 14,936.91 10,296.00 34,650. 78 24,645.90 13, 176.00 44,343.30 31 ,539.86 
2028 6,240.00 21 ,840.49 15,370.08 10,296.00 36,036.81 25,360.63 13,176.00 46,117.03 32,454.52 
2029 6,240.00 22,714.11 15,815.81 10,296.00 37,478.28 26,096.09 13,176.00 47,961 .72 33,395.70 
2030 6,240.00 23,622.67 16,274.47 10,296.00 38,977.41 26,852.88 13,176.00 49,880.18 34,364.17 
Note: 1. (LE) 1 = 520 * 12= 6240 
2. (LE-65) 1 =(LE) 1 * (CPI-UA) 1 
3. (LE-65C) 1=(LE)1*(CPI-A)1 
4. (AE) 1 = 858 * 12= 10,296 
5. (AE-65) 1=(AE)1*(CPI-UA)1 
6 . (AE-65C) 1 = (AE) 1 * (CPI-A) 1 
7. (HE) l = 1,098 * 12= 13, 176 
8. (HE-65) 1 =(HE) 1 * (CPI-UA), 
9. (HE-65C) 1 =(HE) 1 * (CPI-A) 1 
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Table 14. Expected annual benefit for retirement workers turning 65 in 1995 with male 
survival probabiJjty 
Male Male 
Year Survival LE-M LE65-M LE65G-M AE-M AE65-M AE65G-M HE-M HE65-M HE65G-M 
probability 
1995 0.976338 6,092.35 6,092.35 6,092.35 10,052.38 10,052.38 10,052.38 12,864.23 12,864.23 12,864.23 
1996 0.950945401 5,933.90 6,105.98 6,040.71 9,790.93 10,074.87 9,967.17 12,529.66 12,893.02 12,755.19 
1997 o.924053616 5,766.09 6,123.18 5,993.15 9,514.06 10,103.24 9,888.70 12.115.33 12,929.32 12.654.n 
1998 0.895964234 5,590.82 6,127.03 5,933.00 9,224.85 10,109.60 9,789.45 11 ,805.22 12,937.46 12,527.76 
1999 0.866855252 5,409.18 6,129.52 5,872.27 8,925.14 10,113.71 9,689.25 11.421 .68 12,942.72 12,399.53 
2000 0.836698225 5,221 .00 6, 123.35 5,804.01 8,61 4.64 10, 103.53 9,576.62 
2001 0.805359693 5,025.44 6,106.18 5,726.29 8,291 .98 10,075.20 9,448.38 
2002 o.n2763565 4,822.04 6,087.55 5,648.37 7,956.37 10,044.45 9,319.81 
2003 0.738828426 4,610.29 6,053.03 5,556.94 7,606.98 9,987.49 9,168.94 
2004 0.70351686 4,389.95 5,994.28 5,444.80 7,243.41 9,890.56 8,983.91 
2005 0.666853782 4,161.17 5,909.17 5,310.72 6,865.93 9,750.12 8,762.68 
2006 0.628920472 3,924.46 5,795.95 5,153.87 6,475.37 9,563.32 8,503.89 
2007 0.589831807 3,680.55 5,653.15 4,973.72 6,072.91 
2008 o.549755095 3,430.47 5,479.80 4,no.21 5,660.28 
2009 0.508906642 3,175.58 5,275.54 4,543.83 5,239.70 
2010 0.467544237 2,917.48 5,040.63 4,295.58 4,813.84 
2011 0.425984697 2,658.14 4,n6.28 4,021.25 4,385.94 
2012 o.3846083n 2,399.96 4,484.85 3,741 .53 3,959.93 
2013 0.343833351 2,145.52 4,169.75 3,441.86 3,540.11 
2014 0.304091373 1,897.53 3,835.30 3,132.31 3,130.92 
2015 0.265812655 1,658.67 3,486.62 2,817.42 2,736.81 
2016 0.229413599 1,431.54 3,129.55 2,502.14 2,362.04 
2011 0.195282362 1.218.56 2,no.50 2,191.64 2,010.63 
2018 0.16376164 1,021 .87 2,416.25 1,891 .19 1,686.09 
2019 0.135129883 843.21 2,073.55 1,605.79 1,391.30 
2020 0.109583984 683.80 1,748.81 1,339.99 1,128.28 
2021 0.087226331 544.29 1,447.69 1,097.53 898.08 
2022 0.068058781 424.69 1,174.75 881 .19 700.73 
2023 0.051984045 324.38 933.18 692.58 535.23 
2024 0.038815083 242.21 724.65 532.13 399.64 
2025 0.028313041 176.67 
2026 0.020165794 125.83 
2027 0.01 402045 87.49 
2028 0.009514936 59.37 
2029 0.006304397 39.34 
2030 0.004070799 25.40 
549.73 
407.20 
294.44 
207.81 
143.20 
96.16 
399.41 
292.73 
209.42 
146.25 
99.71 
66.25 
Note: 1. (LE-M) 1 = (LE) t * S 1 - male 
2. (LE65-M) 1 = (LE-65) 1 • S t - male 
291 .51 
207.63 
144.35 
97.97 
64.91 
41 .91 
3. (LE65C-M) 1 = (LE-65C), • S 1 - male 
4. (AE-M), = (AE) t * S, - male 
5. (AE65-M) 1 = (AE-65) 1 • S , - male 
6. (AE65C-M) , = (AE-65C) 1 • S , - male 
7. (HE-M) 1 = (HE),• S, - male 
8. (HE65-M) 1 = (HE-65) 1 • S , - ma.le 
9. (HE65C-M) 1=(HE-65C) 1•S 1 - maJe 
9,327.70 
9,041 .67 
8,704.64 
8,317.04 
7,880.86 
7,400.00 
6,880.09 
6,328.25 
5,752.92 
5,163.75 
4,571 .33 
3,986.81 
3,421 .35 
2,885.54 
2,388.69 
1,938.34 
1.539.75 
1, 195.68 
907.05 
671 .89 
485.82 
342.89 
236.28 
158.67 
8,206.64 
7,870.85 
7,497.32 
7,087.71 
6,644.97 
6,173.52 
5,679.07 
5,168.31 
4,648.75 
4,128.52 
3,616.21 
3,120.46 
2,649.56 
2,210.98 
1,810.92 
1,453.96 
1,142.76 
878.01 
659.02 
483.00 
345.55 
241 .30 
164.52 
109.31 
11 ,024.34 12,929.69 12,255.39 
10,611.42 12,893.44 12,091.28 
10, 181 .93 12,854.09 11,926.75 
9,734.80 12,781 .20 11 ,733.68 
9,269.54 12,657.14 11 ,496.90 
8,786.47 
8,286.66 
12,4n.43 11 ,213.78 
12,238.37 10,882.60 
1,n1 .62 11 ,936.84 10.502.20 
7,243.57 11 ,570.81 10,072.49 
6,705.35 11,139.51 9,594.47 
6, 160.36 10,643.49 9,070.29 
5,612.n 10.oas.29 8,503.70 
5,067.60 9,469.93 7,900.38 
4,530.35 8,804.59 7,267.63 
4,006.71 
3,502.35 
3,022.75 
2,573.04 
2,157.72 
1,780.47 
1,443.88 
1,149.29 
896.74 
684.94 
511 .43 
373.05 
265.70 
184.73 
125.37 
83.07 
53.64 
8,098.39 
7,362.13 
6,608.16 
5,850.02 
5,102.00 
4,378.37 
3,692.68 
3,056.86 
2,480.54 
1,970.45 
1,530.13 
1,160.n 
859.82 
621.71 
438.80 
302.37 
203.05 
6,614.00 
5,949.10 
5,283.36 
4,627.74 
3,993.32 
3,390.69 
2,829.43 
2,317.48 
1,860.66 
1,462.41 
1,123.61 
843.36 
618.10 
442.20 
308.80 
210.54 
139.89 
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Table 15. Expected annual benefit for retirement workers turning 65 in 1995 with female 
survival erobability 
Female Female 
Year Survival LE-F LE65-F LE65C-F AE-F AE65-F AE65C-F HE-F HE65-F HE65C-F 
~robablll!}'. 
1995 0.986343 6,154.78 6,154.78 6,154.78 10,155.39 10,155.39 10,155.39 12,996.06 12,996.06 12,996.06 
1996 0.971532074 6,062.36 6,238.17 6,171.48 10,002.89 10,292.98 10,182.95 12,800.91 13,172.13 13,031 .32 
1997 0.955645581 5,963.23 6,332.52 6, 198.05 9,839.33 10,448.66 10,226.76 12,591 .59 13,371 .36 13,087.42 
1998 0.938805195 5,858.14 6,420.00 6,216.69 9,665.94 10,593.00 10,257.54 12,369.70 13,556.07 13,126.76 
1999 0.921059699 5,747.41 6,512.60 6,239.47 9,483.23 10,746.12 10,295.12 12,135.89 13,752.03 13,174.67 
2000 0.902324619 5,630.51 6,603.63 6,259.25 9,290.33 10,896.00 10,327.76 11 ,889.03 13,943.83 13,216.65 
2001 0.682449115 5,506.48 6,690.67 6,274.41 9,085.70 11 ,039.61 10,352.78 11 ,627.15 14, 127.61 13,248.66 
2002 0.861321518 5,374.65 6,785.17 6,295.67 6,868.17 11,195.53 10,387.85 11 ,348.77 14,327.15 13,293.54 
2003 0.838822078 5,234.25 6,872.25 6,309.02 6,636.51 11,339.21 10,409.68 11 .052.32 14,51 1.01 13,321 .73 
2004 0.814835121 5,084.57 6,942.76 6,306.33 6,389.54 11 ,455.55 10,405.45 10,736.27 14,659.90 13,316.07 
2005 0.78921589 4,924.71 6,993.45 6,285.19 6,125.77 11,539.19 10,370.56 10,398.71 14,766.94 13,271.42 
2006 0.761876241 4,754.12 7,021 .25 6,243.43 7,644.30 11 ,585.06 10,301 .67 10,038.51 14,825.64 13,183.25 
2007 0.732834681 4,572.89 7,023.74 6,179.58 7,545.27 11 ,589.17 10,196.32 9,655.83 14,830.89 13,048.43 
2006 0.702142099 4,381.37 6,998.75 6,092.47 7,229.26 11 ,547.94 10,052.58 9,251.42 14,776.13 12,864.49 
2009 0.669830924 4,179.74 6,943.75 5,960.66 6,696.58 11 ,457.19 9,868.09 6,625.69 14,662.00 12,626.40 
2010 0.635859778 3,967.77 6,855.26 5,841 .99 6,546.81 11 ,311 .17 9,639.26 8,378.09 14,475.13 12,335.59 
2011 0.600216023 3,745.35 6,729.82 5,674.43 6,179.82 11 , 104.20 9,362.81 7,908.45 14,210.27 11 ,981 .78 
2012 0.563009232 3,513.18 6,565.15 5,477.04 5,796.74 10,832.49 9,037.11 7,418.21 13,862.56 11 ,564.97 
2013 0.524413823 3,272.34 6,359.70 5,249.52 5,399.36 10,493.50 8,661 .71 6,909.68 13,428.74 11 ,084.57 
2014 0.484650669 3,024.22 6,112.58 4,992.17 4,989.96 10,085.75 8,237.09 6,385.76 12,906.94 10,541 .17 
2015 0.443989932 2,770.50 5,823.74 4,705.97 4,571 .32 9,609.17 7,764.86 5,850.01 12,297.05 9,936.84 
2016 0.402764579 2,513.25 5,494.32 4,392.82 4,146.86 9,065.62 7,248.15 5,306.83 11 ,601 .46 9,275.60 
2017 0.361381324 2,255.02 5,126.96 4,055.76 3,720.76 8,459.51 6,692.01 4,761 .56 10,625.81 6,563.90 
2018 0.320318287 1,998.79 4,726.18 3,699.17 3,298.00 7,798.21 6,103.63 4,220.51 9,979.52 7,810.94 
2019 0260115139 1,747.92 4,298.32 3,328.70 2,884.07 7,092.23 5,492.35 3,690.60 9,076.07 7,028.67 
2020 0.241345523 1,506.00 3,851 .54 2,951 .16 2,484.89 6,355.05 4,869.41 3,179.97 6,132.68 6,231 .48 
2021 0.204584979 1,276.61 3,395.49 2,574.20 2,106.41 5,602.56 4,247.43 2,695.61 7,169.71 5,435.52 
2022 0.170372233 1,063.12 2,940.77 2,205.68 1,754.15 4,852.27 3,639.71 2,244.82 6,209.55 4,657.81 
2023 0.139170263 868.42 2,498.29 1,854.15 1,432.90 4,122.17 3,059.35 1,833.71 5,275.23 3,915.12 
2024 0.111333009 694.72 2,076.51 1,526.30 1,146.28 3,429.55 2,518.39 1,466.92 4,368.86 3,222.83 
2025 0.087154263 543.84 1,692.20 1,229.47 897.34 2,792.13 2,028.63 1,148.34 3,573.14 2,596.08 
2026 0.066725391 416.37 1,347.37 968.58 687.00 2,223.16 1,598.16 879.17 2,845.02 2,045.20 
2027 0.049945223 311 .66 1,048.87 746.03 514.24 1,730.64 1,230.95 658.08 2,214.74 1,575.27 
2028 0.036550463 228.07 798.28 561 .78 376.32 1,317.16 926.94 481 .59 1,685.60 1,186.23 
2029 0.026159898 163.24 594.20 413.74 269.34 960.43 682.67 344.68 1,254.67 673.63 
2030 0.018276953 114.05 431 .75 297.45 168.18 712.39 490.79 240.82 911 .66 628.07 
Nole: 1. (LE-F) l = (LE) 1 • S 1 - female 
2. (LE65-F) l = (LE-65) 1 • S 1 - female 
3. (LE65C-F) 1 = (LE-65C) 1 • S l - female 
4. (AE-F) , = (AE) l * S 1 - female 
5. (AE65-F) 1 = (AE-65) 1 * S l - female 
6. (AE65C-F) 1 = (AE-65C) 1 • S 1 - female 
7. {HE-F) 1={HE) 1•S 1 - female 
8. (HE65-F) I= (HE-65) t • S I - female 
9. (HE65C-F) 1=(HE-65C) 1 •S1 -female 
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Table 16 reveals the present value of the expected annual benefit stream for a 
retirement worker turning 65 in 1995. With the CPI-UA and IR-C, for an individual with 
average earnings, his or her expected annual benefit will be $6,968.93 in 2010. With the CPI-
A and IR-C, it will be reduced to $5,938.87. 
Table 17 and Table 18 show present value of the expected annual benefit stream for 
retirement workers turning 65 in 1995 adjusted for male and female survival probabilities by 
age, discounted by the IR-C. For males age 80 with average earnings, their present value of 
the expected annual benefit will be $3,258.28 with the CPI-UA and IR-C. It will be 
$4,431 .26 for females. With the CPI-A and IR-C, for males surviving age 80 with average 
earnings, their present value of the expected annual benefit will be $2,776.68. It will be 
$3,776.29 for females. After using CPI-A instead of CPI-UA, the present value of the 
expected annual benefit will be reduced by $481 .60 for males and by $654.97 for females. 
From table 19, if the CPI is reduced by 1.1 percentage points to correct for bias, the 
percentage difference in absolute annual benefit level will be larger year by year, regardless of 
different earnings levels. That is, the range of reduction in absolute annual benefit for the 
retirement workers turning 65 in 1995 will be wider and wider over time. For example, the 
difference in absolute annual benefit level is only 1. 07 percent in 1996 in contrast to 19 .19 
percent in 2015. Because more than one-third of the elderly depend on Social Security for 90 
percent or more their annual income (Melcher), these results imply that the probability of a 
retirement worker turning 65 in 1995 falling into poverty will increase significantly year by 
year after the CPI is adjusted for bias. This issue is noteworthy. Coe (1988), examined the 
poverty experience of persons in their elderly years, utilizing data from the Michigan Panel 
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Table 16. Present value of the expected annual benefit stream for retirement workers 
turning 65 in 1995 
Year 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
2014 
2015 
2016 
2017 
2018 
2019 
2020 
2021 
2022 
2023 
2024 
2025 
2026 
2027 
2028 
2029 
PV-LE 
6,240.00 
5,864.66 
5,506.72 
5,170.63 
4,855.05 
4,558.74 
4,280.50 
4,019.25 
3,n3.95 
3,543.61 
3,330.46 
3,130.13 
2,941 .85 
2,764.90 
2,598.59 
2,444.58 
2,299.70 
2,163.41 
2,035.19 
1,914.57 
1,801 .10 
1,694.36 
1,593.94 
1,499.47 
1,410.60 
1,327.00 
1,248.36 
1,174.37 
1,104.n 
1,039.30 
9n,70 
919.76 
865.25 
813.97 
765.72 
PV-LE65 
6,240.00 
6,034.74 
5,847.74 
5,666.55 
5,501 .61 
5,346.63 
5,201 .04 
5,074.07 
4,954.96 
4,638.64 
4,729.50 
4,622.82 
4,518.55 
4,416.63 
4,317.00 
4,223.60 
4, 132.21 
4,042.80 
3,955.33 
3,869.75 
3,786.02 
3,704.10 
3,623.96 
3,545.54 
3,468.83 
3,393.78 
3,320.34 
3,248.50 
3,178.22 
3,109.45 
3,042.17 
2,976.35 
2,911 .95 
2,848.94 
2,787.30 
PV-LE65C 
6,240.00 
5,970.23 
5,723.57 
5,487.10 
5,270.71 
5,067.80 
4,8n.46 
4,708.01 
4,548.86 
4,395.10 
4,250.52 
4,110.70 
3,975.48 
3,844.71 
3,718.24 
3,599.31 
3,484.19 
3,372.75 
3,264.87 
3,160.44 
3,059.36 
2,961 .50 
2,866.78 
2,n5.09 
2,686.32 
2,600.40 
2,517.23 
2,436.72 
2,358.78 
2,283.33 
2,210.30 
2,139.60 
2,071.17 
2,004.92 
1,940.79 
PV-AE PV-AE65 PV-AE65C PV-HE PV-HE65 PV-HE65C 
10,296.00 10,296.00 10,296.00 13,176.00 13,176.00 13,176.00 
9,676.69 
9,086.10 
8,531 .55 
8,010.84 
7,521 .92 
7,062.83 
6,631 .n 
6,227.01 
5,846.96 
5,495.26 
5,164.72 
4,854.06 
4,562.09 
4,287.68 
4,033.56 
3,794.51 
3,569.62 
3,358.06 
3,159.04 
2,971 .82 
2,795.69 
2,630.00 
2,474.13 
2,327.50 
2,189.56 
2,059.79 
1,937.71 
1,822.87 
1,714.84 
1,613.21 
1,517.60 
1,427.65 
1,343.04 
1,263.45 
9,957.32 
9,648.78 
9,349.80 
9,0n.65 
8,821 .94 
8,581 .72 
8 ,372.21 
8 ,175.68 
7,983.76 
7,803.68 
7,627.66 
7,455.60 
7,287.43 
7,123.05 
6,968.93 
6,818.15 
6,670.62 
6,526.29 
6,385.08 
6,246.93 
6,111 .n 
5,979.53 
5,850.15 
5,723.57 
5,599.73 
5,478.57 
5,360.03 
5,244.06 
5,130.59 
5,019.58 
4,910.97 
4,804.71 
4,700.76 
4,599.05 
9,850.87 12,383.46 12,742.58 12,606.36 
9,443.89 11 ,627.66 12,347.74 12,085.53 
9,053.72 10,917.99 11 ,965.13 11 ,586.23 
8 ,696.67 10,251.63 11 ,616.85 11 , 129.30 
8,361 .87 
8 ,047.81 
7,768.21 
7,505.62 
7,251 .91 
9,625.95 11,289.62 10,700.85 
9,038.45 10,982.20 10,298.94 
8 ,486.81 10,714.09 9,941 .14 
7,968.83 10,462.59 9,605.10 
7,482.47 10,216.98 9,280.42 
7,013.36 7,032.40 9,986.53 8,975.14 
6,782.66 
6,559.55 
6 ,343.n 
6,135.10 
5,938.87 
5,748.91 
5,565.03 
5,387.04 
5,214.73 
5,047.94 
4,886.48 
4,730.19 
4,578.89 
4,432.44 
4,290.66 
4,153.43 
4,020.58 
3,891 .98 
3,767.50 
3,646.99 
3,530.35 
3,417.43 
3,308.12 
3,202.31 
6,609.40 
6,211 .84 
5,638.19 
5,487.03 
5, 161 .83 
4,855.91 
4,568.12 
4,297.38 
4,042.69 
3,803.10 
3,5n.7o 
3,365.66 
3,166.19 
2,978.55 
2,802.02 
2,635.95 
2,479.73 
2,332.n 
2,194.51 
2,064.45 
1,942.10 
1,827.00 
1,718.72 
1,616.86 
9,761 .27 
9,541 .09 
9,325.87 
9,115.52 
8,918.29 
8,725.32 
8,536.53 
8,351 .83 
8,171 .12 
7.994.32 
7,821 .35 
7,652.12 
7,486.55 
7,324.57 
7,166.09 
7,011 .04 
6,859.34 
6,710.92 
6,565.72 
6,423.66 
6,284.67 
6,148.69 
6,015.65 
5,885.49 
8,679.91 
8,394.39 
8,118.25 
7,851 .21 
7,600.09 
7,357.00 
7,121.68 
6,893.90 
6,673.40 
6,459.95 
6,253.33 
6,053.32 
5,859.70 
5,672.28 
5,490.85 
5,315.23 
5,145.22 
4,980.65 
4,821 .34 
4,667.13 
4,517.85 
4,373.35 
4,233.47 
4,098.06 
2030 720.34 2,726.99 1,878.72 1,188.57 4,499.54 3,099.89 1,521.03 5,758.15 3,966.99 
92,392.53 149,206.60 127,861 .07 152,447.67 246, 190.89 210,970. 76 195,090.38 315,055.48 269,983.56 
Note: 1. (PV-LE) 1= (LE) 1 I (IR-C) t 
2. (PV-LE65) 1 = (LE~5) 1 I (IR-C) 1 
3. (PV-LE65C) I= (LE~5C) l I (lR-C) l 
4. (PV-AE) 1 = (AE) 1 I (IR-C) 1 
5. (PV-AE65) 1 = (AE~5) 1 I (IR.-C) 1 
6. (PV-AE65C) t = (AE~5C) t I (IR-C) I 
7. (PV-HE) I = (HE) t I (IR-C) I 
8. (PV-HE65) 1 = (HE~5) 1 / (IR-C) 1 
9. (PV-HE65C) 1 = (HE~5C) 1 I(IR-C) 1 
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Table 17. Present value of expected annual benefit for retirement workers turning 65 in 
1995 with male survival probability 
Year PV-LE-M PV-LE65-M PV-
LE65C-M 
Male 
PV-AE-M PV-AE65-M PV- PV-HE-M PV-HE65-M PV-
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
2014 
2015 
2016 
2017 
2018 
2019 
2020 
2021 
2022 
2023 
2024 
2025 
2026 
2027 
2028 
2029 
2030 
6,092.35 
5,576.97 
5,088.51 
4,632.70 
4,208.63 
3,814.29 
3,447.35 
3,105.93 
2,788.30 
2,492.99 
2,220.93 
1,968.60 
1,735.20 
1,520.02 
1,322.44 
1,142.95 
979.64 
832.06 
699.n 
582.20 
478.76 
388.71 
311 .27 
245.56 
190.61 
145.42 
108.89 
79.93 
57.43 
40.34 
27.68 
18.55 
12.13 
7.74 
4.83 
2.93 
6,092.35 
5,738.71 
5,403.63 
5.on.02 
4,769.10 
4,473.52 
4,188.71 
3,921 .05 
3,660.86 
3,404.07 
3,153.89 
2,907.39 
2,665.18 
2,428.06 
2,196.95 
1,974.72 
1,760.26 
1,554.90 
1,359.97 
1,176.76 
1,006.37 
849.n 
707.69 
580.62 
468.74 
371 .90 
289.62 
221 .09 
165.22 
120.69 
86.13 
60.02 
40.83 
27.11 
17.57 
11 .10 
6,092.35 10,052.38 
5,6n.36 
5,288.88 
4,916.25 
4,568.94 
4,240.22 
3,928.11 
3,638.18 
3,360.83 
3,092.03 
2,834.48 
2,585.31 
2,344.87 
2,113.65 
1,892.24 
1,682.84 
1,484.21 
1,297.19 
1, 122.57 
961 .06 
813.22 
679.41 
559.83 
454.45 
363.00 
284.96 
219.57 
165.84 
122.62 
88.63 
62.58 
43.15 
29.04 
19.08 
12.24 
7.65 
9,202.01 
8,396.04 
7,643.96 
6,944.24 
6,293.57 
5,688.12 
5,124.79 
4,600.69 
4,113.43 
3,664.54 
3,248.20 
2,863.08 
2,508.03 
2,182.03 
1,885.87 
1,616.40 
1,372.91 
1,154.61 
960.64 
789.95 
641.37 
513.59 
405.17 
314.51 
239.94 
179.67 
131.88 
94.76 
66.56 
45.67 
30.60 
20.02 
12.78 
7.97 
4.84 
AE65C-M HE65C-M 
10,052.38 10,052.38 12,864.23 12,864.23 12,864.23 
9,468.86 9,367.64 11.n5.99 12, 117.50 11 ,987.96 
8,915.99 8,726.66 10,744.58 11 ,409.97 11 ,167.68 
8,3n.09 8,11 1.81 9,782.13 10,720.33 10,380.84 
7,869.01 7,538.75 8,886.68 10,070.13 9,647.50 
7,381 .30 6,996.36 8,054.01 9,446.00 8,953.38 
6,911 .37 6,481.38 7,279.20 8,844.62 8,294.35 
6,469.74 
6,040.43 
5,616.71 
5,203.91 
4,797.19 
4,397.55 
4,006.30 
3,624.97 
3,258.28 
2,904.43 
2,565.58 
2,243.96 
1,941 .65 
1,660.51 
1,402.12 
1,167.70 
958.03 
n3.43 
613.64 
4n.88 
364.80 
272.61 
199.14 
142.12 
99.03 
67.36 
44.73 
28.99 
18.32 
6,002.99 
5,545.37 
5,101 .84 
4,676.89 
4,265.75 
3,869.03 
3,487.52 
3,122.19 
2,n6.68 
2,448.95 
2,140.36 
1,852.24 
1,585.75 
1,341 .81 
1,121 .02 
923.72 
749.85 
598.95 
470.19 
362.29 
273.64 
202.32 
146.24 
103.26 
71 .19 
47.91 
31.48 
20.19 
12.62 
6,558.30 
5,887.60 
5,264.05 
4,689.58 
4,156.79 
3,663.94 
3,209.58 
2,792.38 
2,413.38 
2,068.54 
1,756.94 
1,4n.58 
1,229.35 
1,010.91 
820.n 
657.25 
518.50 
402.49 
307.06 
229.92 
168.n 
121 .27 
85.18 
58.45 
39.16 
25.62 
16.35 
10.19 
6.19 
8,279.46 
7,730.06 
7,187.82 
6,659.55 
6,139.06 
5,627.64 
5,126.95 
4,638.95 
4,169.69 
3,716.85 
3,283.22 
2,871 .64 
2,484.77 
2,124.99 
1,794.32 
1,494.32 
1,226.01 
989.77 
785.29 
611.55 
466.84 
348.86 
254.85 
181 .87 
126.74 
86.21 
57.24 
37.10 
23.44 
7,682.15 
7,096.52 
6,528.93 
5,985.11 
5,458.97 
4,951 .28 
4,463.05 
3,995.53 
3,553.38 
3 ,133.97 
2,739.06 
2,370.35 
2,029.32 
1,717.14 
1,434.60 
1, 182.11 
959.59 
766.49 
601.71 
463.63 
350.18 
258.91 
187.14 
132.14 
91 .11 
61.32 
40.28 
25.84 
16.15 
56,372.61 72,931 .58 67,046.80 93,014.80 120,337.11 110,627.22 119,032.93 153,997.84 141 ,571 .90 
Note: I. (PV-LE-M) 1= (PV-LE),•S 1 - male 
2. (PV-LE65-M) 1 - (PV-LE65), • S 1 - male 
3. (PV-LE65C-M) 1 - (PV-LE65C) 1 • S 1 - male 
4. (PV-AE-M) 1= (PV-AE),•S 1 - male 
S. (PV-AE6S-M), = (PV-AE6S) 1 • S 1 - male 
6. (PV-AE65C-M), = (PV-AE6SC) 1 • S , - male 
7. (PV-HE-M), = (PY-HE),• S 1 - male 
8. (PV-HE6S-M), = (PV-HE6S) 1 •S 1 - male 
9. (PV-HE6SC-M) 1 =(PV-HE6SC) 1 •S 1 - male 
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Table 18. Present value of expected annuaJ benefit for retirement workers turning 65 in 
1995 with female survivaJ probability 
Year 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
2014 
2015 
2016 
2017 
2018 
2019 
Female 
PV-LE-F PV-LE65-F PV- PV-AE-F PV-AE65-F 
6,154.78 
5,697.71 
5,262.48 
4,854.22 
4,471 .80 
4,113.46 
3,m .33 
3,461 .87 
3,165.67 
LE65C-F 
6,154.78 
5,862.94 
5,588.37 
5,319.78 
6,154.78 10,155.39 10,155.39 
5,800.27 9,401 .22 9,673.85 
5,469.70 8 ,683.09 
5, 151 .32 8,009.46 
5,067.31 4,854.64 7,378.46 
4,824.40 4,572.80 6,787.21 
4,589.65 4,304.11 6,232.59 
4,370.40 4,055.11 5,712.08 
4, 156.33 3,815.69 5,223.35 
9,220.81 
8,m .64 
8,361 .06 
7,960.25 
7,572.93 
7,211 .17 
6,857.94 
2,887.46 3,942.70 3,581 .28 4,764.31 6,505.45 
2,628.45 
2,384.78 
2,155.89 
1,941 .35 
1,740.62 
1,554.41 
1,380.32 
1,218.02 
1,067.28 
927.90 
799.67 
682.43 
576.02 
480.31 
395.13 
3,732.60 
3,522.03 
3,311 .35 
3,101 .10 
2,891 .66 
2,685.61 
2,480.22 
2,276.14 
2,074.23 
1,875.48 
1,680.95 
1,491 .88 
1,309.63 
1,135.70 
971 .67 
3,354.58 
3, 131 .86 
2,913.37 
2,699.53 
2,490.59 
2,288.66 
2,091.27 
1,898.89 
1,712.14 
1,531.71 
1,358.32 
1,192.79 
1,036.00 
888.91 
752.48 
4,336.95 
3,934.89 
3,557.22 
3,203.23 
2,872.02 
2,564.78 
2,277.52 
2,009.73 
1,761 .01 
1,531 .03 
1,319.46 
1, 126.01 
950.43 
792.51 
651 .97 
6,158.79 
5,811 .35 
5,463.72 
5, 116.81 
4,771.24 
4,431 .26 
4,092.36 
3,755.62 
3,422.48 
3,094.54 
2,773.57 
2,461 .60 
2,160.89 
1,873.91 
1,603.26 
PV-
AE65C-F 
10,155.39 
9,570.44 
9,025.01 
8,499.68 
8,010.15 
7,545.12 
7,101.78 
6,690.93 
6,295.88 
5,909.11 
5,535.06 
5,167.56 
4,807.06 
4,454.23 
4,109.48 
3,776.29 
3,450.59 
3,133.16 
2,825.04 
2,527.32 
2,241 .23 
1,968.10 
1,709.40 
1,466.70 
1,241 .59 
PV-HE-F PV-HE65-F PV-
HE65C-F 
12,996.06 12,996.06 12,996.06 
12,030.93 12,379.82 12.247.48 
11 , 111 .92 11 ,800.06 11 ,549.49 
10,249.87 11,232.93 10,877 .21 
9,442.37 10,699.82 10,250.76 
8 ,685.73 10,186.90 9,655.64 
7,975.97 9,691 .23 9,088.29 
7,309.87 
6,684.43 
6,096.98 
5,550.08 
5,035.56 
4,552.25 
4,099.24 
3,675.38 
3,282.20 
2,914.59 
2,571 .89 
2,253.61 
1,959.29 
1,688.54 
1,440.97 
1,216.29 
1,014.19 
834.34 
9,228.28 
8,776.25 
8,325.16 
7,881 .53 
7,436.90 
6,992.04 
6,548.09 
6,105.85 
5,670.78 
5,237.08 
4,806.15 
4,379.81 
3,960.14 
3,549.40 
3,150.16 
2,765.33 
2,398.08 
2,051 .72 
8,562.52 
8,056.97 
7,562.01 
7,083.33 
6,613.03 
6,151 .70 
5,700.17 
5,258.98 
4,832.59 
4,415.79 
4,009.57 
3,615.26 
3,234.27 
2,868.15 
2,518.62 
2,187.56 
1,876.97 
1,588.89 
2020 320.27 819.07 627.60 528.44 1,351 .47 1,035.53 676.25 1,729.50 1,325.19 
2021 255.40 679.29 514.99 421 .40 1,120.83 849.73 539.28 1,434.35 1,087.42 
2022 200.08 553.45 41 5.15 330.13 913.20 685.00 422.48 1,168.64 876.60 
2023 153.75 442.31 328.27 253.69 729.82 541 .65 324.65 933.96 693.16 
2024 115.71 346.18 254.21 190.92 571.20 419.45 244.32 730.98 536.77 
2025 85.21 265.14 192.64 140.60 437.48 317.85 179.93 559.85 406.76 
2026 61 .37 198.60 142.77 101 .26 327.69 235.56 129.59 419.35 301.46 
2027 43.21 145.44 103.44 71.30 239.97 170.68 91 .25 307.10 218.43 
2028 29.75 104.13 73.28 49.09 171 .81 120.91 62.82 219.87 154.74 
2029 20.03 72.92 50.77 33.05 120.31 83.77 42.30 153.96 107.20 
2030 13.17 49.84 34.34 21 .72 82.24 56.66 27.80 105.24 72.50 
65,077.29 88,093.29 79,838.25 107,377.53 145,353.93 131 ,733.11 137,413.20 186,012.37 168,581.53 
Note: I. (PV-LE-F), - (PV-LE) 1 • S 1 - female 
2. (PV-LE65-F) 1 ~ (PV-LE65) 1 • S 1 - female 
3. (PV-LE65C..F), - (PV-LE65C) 1 • S 1 - female 
4. (PV-AE-F), = (PV-AE) 1 • S, - femnle 
5. (PV-AE65-F), • (PV-AE65), • S, - female 
6. (PV-AE65C..F) , = (PV-AE6.5C) 1 • S, - female 
7. (PV-HE-F), = (PV-HE) 1 • S 1 • fomnle 
8. (PV-H£65-F), = ( PV-HE6.5) 1 • S 1 - female 
9. (PV-HE6.5C-F) 1 = (PV-HE6.5C) 1 •S 1 ·female 
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Table 19. Percentage difference in absolute annual benefit level using the CPI-UA and CPI-A 
Year LE-Difference AE-Difference HE-Difference 
1995 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
1996 1.07% 1.07% 1.07% 
1997 2.12% 2.12% 2.12% 
1998 3.17% 3.17% 3.17% 
1999 4.20% 4.20% 4.20% 
2000 5.22% 5.22% 5.22% 
2001 6 .22% 6.22% 6 .22% 
2002 7.21 % 7.21 % 7.21 % 
2003 8.20% 8.20% 8.20% 
2004 9.17% 9.17% 9.17% 
2005 10.13% 10.13% 10.13% 
2006 11 .08% 11 .08% 11 .08% 
2007 12.02% 12.02% 12.02% 
2008 12.95% 12.95% 12.95% 
2009 13.87% 13.87% 13.87% 
2010 14.78% 14.78% 14.78% 
2011 15.68% 15.68% 15.68% 
2012 16.57% 16.57% 16.57% 
2013 17.46% 17.46% 17.46% 
2014 18.33% 18.33% 18.33% 
2015 19.19% 19.19% 19.19% 
2016 20.05% 20.05% 20.05% 
2017 20.89% 20.89% 20.89% 
2018 21 .73% 21 .73% 21 .73% 
2019 22.56% 22.56% 22.56% 
2020 23.38% 23.38% 23.38% 
2021 24.19% 24.19% 24.19% 
2022 24.99% 24.99% 24.99% 
2023 25.78% 25.78% 25.78% 
2024 26.57% 26.57% 26.57% 
2025 27.34% 27.34% 27.34% 
2026 28.11 % 28.11 % 28.11 % 
2027 28.87% 28.87% 28.87% 
2028 29.63% 29.63% 29.63% 
2029 30.37% 30.37% 30.37% 
2030 31 .11 % 31.11 % 31 .11% 
Note: 1. (LE-Difference) 1 = [(LE-65) 1 -(LE-65C) t] I (LE-65) 1 
2. (AE-Difference) 1= [(AE-65)1 -(AE-65C) i] I (AE-65) 1 
3. (HE-Difference) t = [(HE-65)t -(HE-65C) 1] I (HE-65) 1 
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Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) from 1970 to 1982. He concluded that the exit 
probabilities for an elderly person defined to begin at age 65 in the first 3 elderly years of a 
poverty spell are relatively high; 42.3 percent, 23 .1 percent, and 21.5 percent, respectively. 
The results were virtually equivalent to those which have been reported for non-elderly 
persons. After these first 3 years, however, exit probabilities fall dramatically for elderly 
persons. Implied is that if an elderly person is unable to escape poverty after the first 3 elderly 
years of being poor, it is highly likely that the persons will remain poor. 
Those among the elderly most likely to be poor are elderly widows, many of who 
depend on survivors benefits based on the earnings of deceased workers with a history of low 
earnings. Furthermore, if the worker accepted a benefit cut for early retirement, this benefit 
reduction is inherited by a surviving spouse. A reduction in the annual COLA to correct for 
alleged CPI bias is likely to have its greatest impact on this group of beneficiaries owing to 
the compounding of benefit cuts that occur over time, as shown in table 19. 
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) provides a safety net for Social Security 
beneficiaries with inadequate benefits, but it is likely that any correction in the CPI will also 
cause SSI benefits to fall over time, weakening this part of the safety net. 
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INDEXING SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS 
Each year, price inflation adjustments are made for various Federal, State, and local 
programs in the United States. According to the Congressional Research Service, 1996, 
nearly 80 benefit programs provide cash and noncash aid, primarily to persons with limited 
incomes. The combined cost of these programs in fiscal year 1994 was almost $345 billion, 
up 11 percent from the previous fiscal year. Federal funds accounted for approximately 72 
percent of total spending. Thus, all of price inflation adjustments can result in meaningful 
changes in eligibility requirements for the receipt of government benefits and in increases or 
decreases in benefit levels, thereby directly influencing goverrunent budgets (Garner, Johnson, 
and Kokoski, 1996). For instance, a one percentage point COLA cost the federal government 
$3 .41 billion in 1996. 
Bridges and Hambor ( 1982) used an experimental index (known as CPI-XI), 
developed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics with the rental equivalence approach, to make a 
comparison of annual percentage changes in the CPI-XI with annual percentage changes in 
the CPI-W during the period 1967-1981. If CPI-XI had been used as the basis for inflation 
adjustment to OASDI and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits when such 
adjustment began, benefits would now be lower and the OASDI Trust Fund reverses would 
be larger. Table 20 shows how the actual calendar year totals for both OASDI and SSI 
benefit payments would have been reduced had the CPI-XI rather than the CPI-W been used 
to adjust for inflation. 
Clearly, Social Security benefits are guaranteed to an eligible person for the remainder 
of his or her life, and survivor benefits are available for surviving spouses. More than one-
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Table 20. OASDI and Federal SSI cash benefit payment: actual amounts and reductions due 
to indexing by CPI-XI [in billions] 
OASDI benefits Federal SSI benefits 
Calendar year Actual Reduction Actual Reduction 
1975 $66.9 $0.3 $4.314 $0.020 
1976 75.7 0.8 4.512 0.045 
1977 84.6 1.0 4.703 0.050 
1978 92.9 1.3 4.881 0.065 
1979 104.3 2.2 5.279 0.110 
1980 120.5 4.7 5.866 0.225 
1981 141.0 7.5 6.518 0.360 
Source: Benjamin Bridges, and John C. Hambor. Notes and brief reports, Social Security 
Bulletin, August 1982, Vol. 45: 17. 
third of the elderly depend on Social Security for 90 percent or more of their annual income 
(Melcher, 1988). Current legislation provides for automatic cost-of-living increases so that 
the real value of this asset is unaffected by inflation. By assisting older Americans in keeping 
pace with the actual increase in the cost of living, the CPI-W plays a major role in the 
determination of the well-being of most older persons. 
The Need for a Separate Consumer Price Index for Elderly 
Several previous studies have attempted to develop a separate price index for the 
elderly to test the hypothesis that the elderly have been adversely affected by inflation relative 
to the general population at large. Most of them conclude the inflation experience of the 
elderly was not significantly different from the general population (Amble and Stewart, 1994; 
Boskin and Hurd, 1985; Bridges and Packard, 1981 ; Clark, Maddox, Schrimper, and 
Sumner, 1984; Cobb, 1991). 
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The CPI-U and CPI-Ware designed to measure the change in the cost of purchasing 
a fixed market basket of goods and services representing average consumption patterns 
during some base period (Moulton, 1996). Population subgroups-- such as the elderly-- may 
on average consume a different enough market basket that if the goods they consume in 
greater proportion experience significantly different price changes than the average, then the 
overall CPI might be a poor measure of the true change in their cost of living (Boskin, 1995). 
For instance, within the medical care component, the elderly had larger out-of-packet costs 
relative to the nonelderly (Amble and Stewart, 1994; Borzilleri, 1978; Boskin and Hurd, 
1985; Bridges and Packard, 1981; Clark, Maddox, Schrimper, and Sumner, 1984; Cobb, 
1991; Melcher, 1988). The different spending patterns imply possible differential effects of 
relative price changes. In addition, the CPI-W covers only wage earners and clerical workers, 
who present roughly 32 percent of the U.S. population. The survey does not include retired 
people. The CPl-U, which tracks costs for all urban consumers, who represent nearly 80 
percent of the U.S. population, includes retirees (Abraham, 1995b; Amble and Stewart, 1994; 
Melcher, 1988). The CPI-W may not be the most appropriate index for use in indexing Social 
Security benefits because it excludes retired people-- especially those 62 years old and over. 
Borzilleri (1978) employed data from the 1972- 1973 Consumer Expenditure Survey. 
The average budget shares were derived for 15 categories of consumer expense reported by 
all urban and rural families and single consumers 65 years of age or older. These shares were 
then used to weight the month-to-month price changes reported for these items from January 
1970 through March 1977. He pointed out that the measured increase in the OPI was greater 
than that measured by the CPI in 18 out of 26 quarters. He concluded the prices of goods and 
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services increased approximately 4 percent faster for older people than indicated by the CPI 
currently in use over this period. 
Bridges and Packard (1981) fashioned an annual Consumer Price Index for older 
consumers (CPI-0), using BLS price indexes for the seven major expenditure classes for the 
period 1967-1979. The seven weights for older consumers were derived from the 1972-1973 
Consumer Expenditure Surveys. These weights were for all consumer units headed by 
persons aged 65 or older and are used in computing the CPI-0 for each year of the 1967-
1979 period. Since the published CPI-W for the period 1967-77 used major expenditure class 
weights derived from the 1960-61 Consumer Expenditure Surveys, it was necessary to 
construct a Consumer Price Index for urban wage earners and clerical workers (CPI-We) 
using the 1972-73 Consumer Expenditure Surveys data. All differences between the CPI-0 
and the CPI-We are due to the use of different major expenditure class weights. Table 21 
describes annual indexes and percentage changes for the CPI-0 and CPI-We from 1967 to 
1979. During this period, the CPI-0 increased slightly faster than the CPI-We. The slightly 
faster increase of the CPI-0 was fairly persistent. For 7 of the 12 years, the percentage 
increase of the CPI-0 was slightly greater than that of the CPI-We. Only in 1979 was the 
percentage increase of the CPI-0 slightly less than that of the CPI-We. 
Boskin and Hurd ( 1985) dealt with the 1972-1973 interview portion of the Consumer 
Expenditure Survey (CES). In this survey, conducted by the BLS, 19,975 households were 
interviewed, each over a 15-month period, to determine out their expenditures in detail. They 
calculated Laspeyres indices by age group, taking the expenditure share weights from the 
CES. The price changes were taken from the CPI Detailed Report. They divided the 
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Table 21 . Constructed consumer price indexes: annual indexes 
and Eercentage changes, 1967-1979. [1967= 100.0) 
CPI-0 CPI-We 
Year Index Percentage Index Percentage 
change change 
1967 100.0 100.0 
1968 104.2 4.2 104.2 4 .2 
1969 109.9 5.5 109.9 5.5 
1970 116.5 6.0 116.2 5.7 
1971 121.7 4.5 121.2 4.3 
1972 125.7 3.3 125.1 3.2 
1973 133.1 5.9 132.3 5.8 
1974 147.9 11.1 147.0 11.1 
1975 162.0 9.5 160.7 9.3 
1976 172.0 6.2 170.6 6.2 
1977 183.5 6.7 181.7 6.5 
1978 197.6 7.7 195.2 7.4 
1979 219.9 11.3 217.7 11.5 
Source: Benjamin Bridges and Michael D. Packard. Price and 
Income Changes for the Elderly, Social Security Bulletin, 
Jan. 1981, Vol. 44: 4 
population into six age groups: 21-54, 55-59, 60-64, 65-69, 70-74, and 75 and older. They 
defined those aged 60 and over as elderly. Because a house purchase has an investment 
component as well as a consumption component, its treatment in the official CPI has been 
controversial. Their calculation was based on the rental equivalence concept: the annual 
expenditure on housing is said to be the amount the house would rent for. They concluded 
that, conditional on a housing adjustment, the cost-of-living indices and annual inflation rates 
for the elderly population from 1961-1981 were similar to that of the general population. For 
example, in 1981, the largest difference was that between 21-54 and 60-64, a difference of2 
points, less than 1 percent of the cumulative cost of living. The nonelderly inflation rate was 
measured at 9.58 percent, within three-tenths of 1 percentage point of that for any of the 
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elderly age groups. In addition, they found that the official Consumer Price Index 
substantially overstated the cost of living; this overstatement was about 22 basis points or 
approximately 10 percent in 1981 . The difference was due almost exclusively to the treatment 
of housing. 
Cobb (1991) used cross-section individual household expenditure data from the 1972-
1973 Consumer Expenditure Survey to estimate his expenditure system. The price data used 
to establish all indexes were taken from 1967-1984 CPI data for the U.S. and six U.S. cities, 
including Atlanta, Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Minneapolis, and San Francisco. His 
subsample contained roughly 4, lOO households which are divided into 24 demographic 
groups according to age of family head (>64 and <64 years) , and family size (single /couple 
/couple with own children only). Finally, he chose ten household groups with at least 100 
households to limit his analysis. All indexes were calculated for several city price series and at 
several expenditure levels for each household group. He discovered both substantial 
differences in how they allocate expenditure and in their ability to substitute among the 
expenditure groups within the ten household groups. Though poor and elderly households 
inclined to display higher cost of living increases during the period 1967-1984, the differences 
from the other groups were small. Therefore, he concluded that group-specific fixed-weight 
indexes are better cost-of-living approximations than a general Consumer Price Index even 
though aU substitution bias estimates, by income and household type, are quite small. 
Amble and Stewart (1994) indicated that the Bureau of Labor Statistics developed an 
experimental Consumer Prince Index, reweighted to incorporate the spending patterns of 
those 62 years of age and older. BLS observed that from December 1982 to December 1987, 
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the experimental Consumer Price Index for older Americans rose slightly faster than the CPI-
U and CPI-W. They updated the experimental Consumer Price Index for the period from 
December 1987 through December 1993. They showed the experimental Consumer Price 
Index rose 28. 7 percent, slightly more than the increases of 26.3 percent for the CPI-U and 
25.5 percent for the CPI-W; see the totals in Table 22. Although there were various 
limitations (expenditure weights, areas and outlets priced, item priced, and prices collected) 
inherent in the methodology, they concluded the medical care component accounted for most 
of the difference between the experimental Consumer Price Index and either the CPI-U or the 
CPI-W. In the experimental Consumer Price Index, this component increased 59.4 percent 
from 1988 to 1993. By contrast, inflation for the medical care component of the CPI-U was 
54.2 percent and that for the CPI-W was 53.3 percent. 
Table 22. Percent change in alternative Consumer Price Index, all items, 
12 months ended December, 1988-1993. 
Year CPI-U CPI-W Experimental Index for 
1988 4.4 
1989 4.6 
1990 6.1 
1991 3.1 
1992 2.9 
1993 2.7 
Cumulative change, 
Dec.1987-Dec.1993 26.3 
4.4 
4.5 
6.1 
2.8 
2.9 
2.5 
25.5 
older Americans 
4.5 
5.2 
6 .6 
3.4 
3.0 
3.1 
28.7 
Source: Nathan Amble and Ken Stewart, 1994. Experimental price index for 
elderly consumers, Monthly Labor Review, May, 1994: 15. 
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CONCLUSION 
Earnings are found to be higher for Whites relative to Nonwhites, for males relative to 
females. OASDI, with its formula based on earnings history, tends to compound the benefit 
differences, although the structure does provide proportionately larger returns for those at 
lower earnings levels. But the disparity between the Social Security benefits of Whites and 
Blacks, and between males and females, remains large. In addition, mortality rates were 
found to be higher for Nonwhites relative to Whites, for males relative to females, and for the 
less educated relative to the more educated. Some of researchers pointed out that differential 
mortality rates may have a significant influence on the distributional character of the Social 
Security program. Therefore, the redistribution effect of the progressive benefit formula, 
intended to provide a higher rate of return on the contributions of workers with low earnings 
than for those with high earnings, may not be as strong as expected. 
Since needs tend to increase and abilities trend to decrease at older ages, one would 
expect that a progressive, need-oriented system like Social Security would attempt to 
increase real benefit levels over the aging process. Social Security benefits are guaranteed to 
an eligible person for the remainder of her or his life, and survivor benefits are available for 
surviving spouses. This lifetime flow of benefits can be viewed as a form of wealth, and its 
value will depend on the individual' s life expectancy. For many elderly, Social Security 
benefits are their largest asset at retirement. As life expectancy has been increasing, the age 
structure of the elderly has also been shifting toward higher ages. 
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If the bias for the CPI is empirical, we must consider whether an escalator intended 
for a specific demographic group, such as Social Security beneficiaries, should reflect the 
expenditure patterns of that group. Furthermore, the index number biases themselves could 
have differing impacts across different demographic groups. Therefore, it is important to 
discover how measured annual inflation rates and cumulative cost of living differed among 
specific demographic groups. 
As a final note, I note several limitations in my thesis. First, I focus on three 
prominent socioeconomic characteristics,, race, sex, and the distribution of earnings. 
Actually, many other factors, such as educational attainment and urban-rural differentials are 
also relevant to understanding the causes for and the pattern of the distribution of earnings in 
the United States. Second, I use a single set of survival probabilities for each sex and cohort 
as the calculation base. The reason is mortality tables that differentiate among people with 
different socioeconomic characteristics are not available for each cohort, although there is 
evidence that socioeconomic differentials have a significant effect on life expectancy. Third, 
the Social Security beneficiaries receive their benefits paid by SSA monthly. Because it is 
very difficult to get the mortality rate by month for each age, I use the expected annual 
benefit instead of the expected monthly benefit to examine the effect of the sex differential in 
mortality. 
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